Daily Papers

Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner; for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them being human-aware loss functions (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO), and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B. Crucially, KTO does not need preferences -- only a binary signal of whether an output is desirable or undesirable for a given input. This makes it far easier to use in the real world, where preference data is scarce and expensive.

Online alignment (e.g., GRPO) is generally more performant than offline alignment (e.g., DPO) -- but why? Drawing on prospect theory from behavioral economics, we propose a human-centric explanation. We prove that online on-policy sampling better approximates the human-perceived distribution of what the model can produce, and PPO/GRPO-style clipping -- originally introduced to just stabilize training -- recovers a perceptual bias in how humans perceive probability. In this sense, PPO/GRPO act as perceptual losses already. Our theory further suggests that the online/offline dichotomy is itself incidental to maximizing human utility, since we can achieve the same effect by selectively training on any data in a manner that mimics human perception, rather than restricting ourselves to online on-policy data. Doing so would allow us to post-train more quickly, cheaply, and flexibly without sacrificing performance. To this end, we propose a design pattern that explicitly incorporates perceptual distortions of probability into objectives like DPO/KTO/GRPO, creating humanline variants of them. Surprisingly, we find that these humanline variants, even when trained with offline off-policy data, can match the performance of their online counterparts on both verifiable and unverifiable tasks.

Computer-Aided Design (CAD) models are widely used across industrial design, simulation, and manufacturing processes. Text-to-CAD systems aim to generate editable, general-purpose CAD models from textual descriptions, significantly reducing the complexity and entry barrier associated with traditional CAD workflows. However, rendering CAD models can be slow, and deploying VLMs to review CAD models can be expensive and may introduce reward hacking that degrades the systems. To address these challenges, we propose CAD-Judge, a novel, verifiable reward system for efficient and effective CAD preference grading and grammatical validation. We adopt the Compiler-as-a-Judge Module (CJM) as a fast, direct reward signal, optimizing model alignment by maximizing generative utility through prospect theory. To further improve the robustness of Text-to-CAD in the testing phase, we introduce a simple yet effective agentic CAD generation approach and adopt the Compiler-as-a-Review Module (CRM), which efficiently verifies the generated CAD models, enabling the system to refine them accordingly. Extensive experiments on challenging CAD datasets demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance while maintaining superior efficiency.

Large language models (LLMs) are now widely used across many fields, including marketing research. Sentiment analysis, in particular, helps firms understand consumer preferences. While most NLP studies classify sentiment from review text alone, marketing theories, such as prospect theory and expectation--disconfirmation theory, point out that customer evaluations are shaped not only by the actual experience but also by additional reference points. This study therefore investigates how the content and format of such supplementary information affect sentiment analysis using LLMs. We compare natural language (NL) and JSON-formatted prompts using a lightweight 3B parameter model suitable for practical marketing applications. Experiments on two Yelp categories (Restaurant and Nightlife) show that the JSON prompt with additional information outperforms all baselines without fine-tuning: Macro-F1 rises by 1.6% and 4% while RMSE falls by 16% and 9.1%, respectively, making it deployable in resource-constrained edge devices. Furthermore, a follow-up analysis confirms that performance gains stem from genuine contextual reasoning rather than label proxying. This work demonstrates that structured prompting can enable smaller models to achieve competitive performance, offering a practical alternative to large-scale model deployment.

We introduce meta-factorization, a theory that describes matrix decompositions as solutions of linear matrix equations: the projector and the reconstruction equation. Meta-factorization reconstructs known factorizations, reveals their internal structures, and allows for introducing modifications, as illustrated with SVD, QR, and UTV factorizations. The prospect of meta-factorization also provides insights into computational aspects of generalized matrix inverses and randomized linear algebra algorithms. The relations between the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse, generalized Nystr\"{o}m method, and the CUR decomposition are revealed here as an illustration. Finally, meta-factorization offers hints on the structure of new factorizations and provides the potential of creating them.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

It is typically understood that the training of modern neural networks is a process of fitting the probability distribution of desired output. However, recent paradoxical observations in a number of language generation tasks let one wonder if this canonical probability-based explanation can really account for the empirical success of deep learning. To resolve this issue, we propose an alternative utility-based explanation to the standard supervised learning procedure in deep learning. The basic idea is to interpret the learned neural network not as a probability model but as an ordinal utility function that encodes the preference revealed in training data. In this perspective, training of the neural network corresponds to a utility learning process. Specifically, we show that for all neural networks with softmax outputs, the SGD learning dynamic of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be seen as an iteration process that optimizes the neural network toward an optimal utility function. This utility-based interpretation can explain several otherwise-paradoxical observations about the neural networks thus trained. Moreover, our utility-based theory also entails an equation that can transform the learned utility values back to a new kind of probability estimation with which probability-compatible decision rules enjoy dramatic (double-digits) performance improvements. These evidences collectively reveal a phenomenon of utility-probability duality in terms of what modern neural networks are (truly) modeling: We thought they are one thing (probabilities), until the unexplainable showed up; changing mindset and treating them as another thing (utility values) largely reconcile the theory, despite remaining subtleties regarding its original (probabilistic) identity.

Existing preference optimization methods are mainly designed for directly learning from human feedback with the assumption that paired examples (preferred vs. dis-preferred) are available. In contrast, we propose a method that can leverage unpaired preferred or dis-preferred examples, and works even when only one type of feedback (positive or negative) is available. This flexibility allows us to apply it in scenarios with varying forms of feedback and models, including training generative language models based on human feedback as well as training policies for sequential decision-making problems, where learned (value) functions are available. Our approach builds upon the probabilistic framework introduced in (Dayan and Hinton, 1997), which proposes to use expectation-maximization (EM) to directly optimize the probability of preferred outcomes (as opposed to classic expected reward maximization). To obtain a practical algorithm, we identify and address a key limitation in current EM-based methods: when applied to preference optimization, they solely maximize the likelihood of preferred examples, while neglecting dis-preferred samples. We show how one can extend EM algorithms to explicitly incorporate dis-preferred outcomes, leading to a novel, theoretically grounded, preference optimization algorithm that offers an intuitive and versatile way to learn from both positive and negative feedback.

We consider the distributionally robust optimization (DRO) problem with spectral risk-based uncertainty set and f-divergence penalty. This formulation includes common risk-sensitive learning objectives such as regularized condition value-at-risk (CVaR) and average top-k loss. We present Prospect, a stochastic gradient-based algorithm that only requires tuning a single learning rate hyperparameter, and prove that it enjoys linear convergence for smooth regularized losses. This contrasts with previous algorithms that either require tuning multiple hyperparameters or potentially fail to converge due to biased gradient estimates or inadequate regularization. Empirically, we show that Prospect can converge 2-3times faster than baselines such as stochastic gradient and stochastic saddle-point methods on distribution shift and fairness benchmarks spanning tabular, vision, and language domains.

Personalizing generative models offers a way to guide image generation with user-provided references. Current personalization methods can invert an object or concept into the textual conditioning space and compose new natural sentences for text-to-image diffusion models. However, representing and editing specific visual attributes such as material, style, and layout remains a challenge, leading to a lack of disentanglement and editability. To address this problem, we propose a novel approach that leverages the step-by-step generation process of diffusion models, which generate images from low to high frequency information, providing a new perspective on representing, generating, and editing images. We develop the Prompt Spectrum Space P*, an expanded textual conditioning space, and a new image representation method called \sysname. ProSpect represents an image as a collection of inverted textual token embeddings encoded from per-stage prompts, where each prompt corresponds to a specific generation stage (i.e., a group of consecutive steps) of the diffusion model. Experimental results demonstrate that P* and ProSpect offer better disentanglement and controllability compared to existing methods. We apply ProSpect in various personalized attribute-aware image generation applications, such as image-guided or text-driven manipulations of materials, style, and layout, achieving previously unattainable results from a single image input without fine-tuning the diffusion models. Our source code is available athttps://github.com/zyxElsa/ProSpect.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

The aim of this paper is to present an elementary computable theory of probability, random variables and stochastic processes. The probability theory is baed on existing approaches using valuations and lower integrals. Various approaches to random variables are discussed, including the approach based on completions in a Polish space. We apply the theory to the study of stochastic dynamical systems in discrete-time, and give a brief exposition of the Wiener process as a foundation for stochastic differential equations. The theory is based within the framework of type-two effectivity, so has an explicit direct link with Turing computation, and is expressed in a system of computable types and operations, so has a clean mathematical description.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

Portfolio Selection is an important real-world financial task and has attracted extensive attention in artificial intelligence communities. This task, however, has two main difficulties: (i) the non-stationary price series and complex asset correlations make the learning of feature representation very hard; (ii) the practicality principle in financial markets requires controlling both transaction and risk costs. Most existing methods adopt handcraft features and/or consider no constraints for the costs, which may make them perform unsatisfactorily and fail to control both costs in practice. In this paper, we propose a cost-sensitive portfolio selection method with deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, a novel two-stream portfolio policy network is devised to extract both price series patterns and asset correlations, while a new cost-sensitive reward function is developed to maximize the accumulated return and constrain both costs via reinforcement learning. We theoretically analyze the near-optimality of the proposed reward, which shows that the growth rate of the policy regarding this reward function can approach the theoretical optimum. We also empirically evaluate the proposed method on real-world datasets. Promising results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method in terms of profitability, cost-sensitivity and representation abilities.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Emotional support dialogue systems aim to reduce help-seekers' distress and help them overcome challenges. While human valuesx2013core beliefs that shape an individual's prioritiesx2013are increasingly emphasized in contemporary psychological therapy for their role in fostering internal transformation and long-term emotional well-being, their integration into emotional support systems remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we present a value-driven method for training emotional support dialogue systems designed to reinforce positive values in seekers. Notably, our model identifies which values to reinforce at each turn and how to do so, by leveraging online support conversations from Reddit. We evaluate the method across support skills, seekers' emotional intensity, and value reinforcement. Our method consistently outperforms various baselines, effectively exploring and eliciting values from seekers. Additionally, leveraging crowd knowledge from Reddit significantly enhances its effectiveness. Therapists highlighted its ability to validate seekers' challenges and emphasize positive aspects of their situationsx2013both crucial elements of value reinforcement. Our work, being the first to integrate value reinforcement into emotional support systems, demonstrates its promise and establishes a foundation for future research.

Since the introduction of ChatGPT and GPT-4, these models have been tested across a large number of tasks. Their adeptness across domains is evident, but their aptitude in playing games, and specifically their aptitude in the realm of poker has remained unexplored. Poker is a game that requires decision making under uncertainty and incomplete information. In this paper, we put ChatGPT and GPT-4 through the poker test and evaluate their poker skills. Our findings reveal that while both models display an advanced understanding of poker, encompassing concepts like the valuation of starting hands, playing positions and other intricacies of game theory optimal (GTO) poker, both ChatGPT and GPT-4 are NOT game theory optimal poker players. Profitable strategies in poker are evaluated in expectations over large samples. Through a series of experiments, we first discover the characteristics of optimal prompts and model parameters for playing poker with these models. Our observations then unveil the distinct playing personas of the two models. We first conclude that GPT-4 is a more advanced poker player than ChatGPT. This exploration then sheds light on the divergent poker tactics of the two models: ChatGPT's conservativeness juxtaposed against GPT-4's aggression. In poker vernacular, when tasked to play GTO poker, ChatGPT plays like a nit, which means that it has a propensity to only engage with premium hands and folds a majority of hands. When subjected to the same directive, GPT-4 plays like a maniac, showcasing a loose and aggressive style of play. Both strategies, although relatively advanced, are not game theory optimal.

We study the problem of planning under model uncertainty in an online meta-reinforcement learning (RL) setting where an agent is presented with a sequence of related tasks with limited interactions per task. The agent can use its experience in each task and across tasks to estimate both the transition model and the distribution over tasks. We propose an algorithm to meta-learn the underlying structure across tasks, utilize it to plan in each task, and upper-bound the regret of the planning loss. Our bound suggests that the average regret over tasks decreases as the number of tasks increases and as the tasks are more similar. In the classical single-task setting, it is known that the planning horizon should depend on the estimated model's accuracy, that is, on the number of samples within task. We generalize this finding to meta-RL and study this dependence of planning horizons on the number of tasks. Based on our theoretical findings, we derive heuristics for selecting slowly increasing discount factors, and we validate its significance empirically.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

Conventional wisdom suggests that neural network predictions tend to be unpredictable and overconfident when faced with out-of-distribution (OOD) inputs. Our work reassesses this assumption for neural networks with high-dimensional inputs. Rather than extrapolating in arbitrary ways, we observe that neural network predictions often tend towards a constant value as input data becomes increasingly OOD. Moreover, we find that this value often closely approximates the optimal constant solution (OCS), i.e., the prediction that minimizes the average loss over the training data without observing the input. We present results showing this phenomenon across 8 datasets with different distributional shifts (including CIFAR10-C and ImageNet-R, S), different loss functions (cross entropy, MSE, and Gaussian NLL), and different architectures (CNNs and transformers). Furthermore, we present an explanation for this behavior, which we first validate empirically and then study theoretically in a simplified setting involving deep homogeneous networks with ReLU activations. Finally, we show how one can leverage our insights in practice to enable risk-sensitive decision-making in the presence of OOD inputs.

In machine learning, the notion of multi-armed bandits refers to a class of online learning problems, in which an agent is supposed to simultaneously explore and exploit a given set of choice alternatives in the course of a sequential decision process. In the standard setting, the agent learns from stochastic feedback in the form of real-valued rewards. In many applications, however, numerical reward signals are not readily available -- instead, only weaker information is provided, in particular relative preferences in the form of qualitative comparisons between pairs of alternatives. This observation has motivated the study of variants of the multi-armed bandit problem, in which more general representations are used both for the type of feedback to learn from and the target of prediction. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the state of the art in this field, referred to as preference-based multi-armed bandits or dueling bandits. To this end, we provide an overview of problems that have been considered in the literature as well as methods for tackling them. Our taxonomy is mainly based on the assumptions made by these methods about the data-generating process and, related to this, the properties of the preference-based feedback.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

In many real-world scenarios, rewards extrinsic to the agent are extremely sparse, or absent altogether. In such cases, curiosity can serve as an intrinsic reward signal to enable the agent to explore its environment and learn skills that might be useful later in its life. We formulate curiosity as the error in an agent's ability to predict the consequence of its own actions in a visual feature space learned by a self-supervised inverse dynamics model. Our formulation scales to high-dimensional continuous state spaces like images, bypasses the difficulties of directly predicting pixels, and, critically, ignores the aspects of the environment that cannot affect the agent. The proposed approach is evaluated in two environments: VizDoom and Super Mario Bros. Three broad settings are investigated: 1) sparse extrinsic reward, where curiosity allows for far fewer interactions with the environment to reach the goal; 2) exploration with no extrinsic reward, where curiosity pushes the agent to explore more efficiently; and 3) generalization to unseen scenarios (e.g. new levels of the same game) where the knowledge gained from earlier experience helps the agent explore new places much faster than starting from scratch. Demo video and code available at https://pathak22.github.io/noreward-rl/

The Lottery Ticket Hypothesis (LTH) states that a dense neural network model contains a highly sparse subnetwork (i.e., winning tickets) that can achieve even better performance than the original model when trained in isolation. While LTH has been proved both empirically and theoretically in many works, there still are some open issues, such as efficiency and scalability, to be addressed. Also, the lack of open-source frameworks and consensual experimental setting poses a challenge to future research on LTH. We, for the first time, examine previous research and studies on LTH from different perspectives. We also discuss issues in existing works and list potential directions for further exploration. This survey aims to provide an in-depth look at the state of LTH and develop a duly maintained platform to conduct experiments and compare with the most updated baselines.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

In order for AI systems to communicate effectively with people, they must understand how we make decisions. However, people's decisions are not always rational, so the implicit internal models of human decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) must account for this. Previous empirical evidence seems to suggest that these implicit models are accurate -- LLMs offer believable proxies of human behavior, acting how we expect humans would in everyday interactions. However, by comparing LLM behavior and predictions to a large dataset of human decisions, we find that this is actually not the case: when both simulating and predicting people's choices, a suite of cutting-edge LLMs (GPT-4o & 4-Turbo, Llama-3-8B & 70B, Claude 3 Opus) assume that people are more rational than we really are. Specifically, these models deviate from human behavior and align more closely with a classic model of rational choice -- expected value theory. Interestingly, people also tend to assume that other people are rational when interpreting their behavior. As a consequence, when we compare the inferences that LLMs and people draw from the decisions of others using another psychological dataset, we find that these inferences are highly correlated. Thus, the implicit decision-making models of LLMs appear to be aligned with the human expectation that other people will act rationally, rather than with how people actually act.

The remarkable abilities of large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 partially stem from post-training processes like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involving human preferences encoded in a reward model. However, these reward models (RMs) often lack direct knowledge of why, or under what principles, the preferences annotations were made. In this study, we identify principles that guide RMs to better align with human preferences, and then develop an axiomatic framework to generate a rich variety of preference signals to uphold them. We use these axiomatic signals to train a model for scoring answers to longform questions. Our approach yields a Preference Model with only about 220M parameters that agrees with gold human-annotated preference labels more often than GPT-4. The contributions of this work include: training a standalone preference model that can score human- and LLM-generated answers on the same scale; developing an axiomatic framework for generating training data pairs tailored to certain principles; and showing that a small amount of axiomatic signals can help small models outperform GPT-4 in preference scoring. We release our model on huggingface: https://huggingface.co/corbyrosset/axiomatic_preference_model

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

The human intrinsic desire to pursue knowledge, also known as curiosity, is considered essential in the process of skill acquisition. With the aid of artificial curiosity, we could equip current techniques for control, such as Reinforcement Learning, with more natural exploration capabilities. A promising approach in this respect has consisted of using Bayesian surprise on model parameters, i.e. a metric for the difference between prior and posterior beliefs, to favour exploration. In this contribution, we propose to apply Bayesian surprise in a latent space representing the agent's current understanding of the dynamics of the system, drastically reducing the computational costs. We extensively evaluate our method by measuring the agent's performance in terms of environment exploration, for continuous tasks, and looking at the game scores achieved, for video games. Our model is computationally cheap and compares positively with current state-of-the-art methods on several problems. We also investigate the effects caused by stochasticity in the environment, which is often a failure case for curiosity-driven agents. In this regime, the results suggest that our approach is resilient to stochastic transitions.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

In this paper, we investigate the influence of claims in analyst reports and earnings calls on financial market returns, considering them as significant quarterly events for publicly traded companies. To facilitate a comprehensive analysis, we construct a new financial dataset for the claim detection task in the financial domain. We benchmark various language models on this dataset and propose a novel weak-supervision model that incorporates the knowledge of subject matter experts (SMEs) in the aggregation function, outperforming existing approaches. We also demonstrate the practical utility of our proposed model by constructing a novel measure of optimism. Here, we observe the dependence of earnings surprise and return on our optimism measure. Our dataset, models, and code are publicly (under CC BY 4.0 license) available on GitHub.

There is a strong link between the general concept of intelligence and the ability to collect and use information. The theory of Bayes-adaptive exploration offers an attractive optimality framework for training machines to perform complex information gathering tasks. However, the computational complexity of the resulting optimal control problem has limited the diffusion of the theory to mainstream deep AI research. In this paper we exploit the inherent mathematical structure of Bayes-adaptive problems in order to dramatically simplify the problem by making the reward structure denser while simultaneously decoupling the learning of exploitation and exploration policies. The key to this simplification comes from the novel concept of cross-value (i.e. the value of being in an environment while acting optimally according to another), which we use to quantify the value of currently available information. This results in a new denser reward structure that "cashes in" all future rewards that can be predicted from the current information state. In a set of experiments we show that the approach makes it possible to learn challenging information gathering tasks without the use of shaping and heuristic bonuses in situations where the standard RL algorithms fail.

Thinking about the future is one of the important activities that people do in daily life. Futurists also pay a lot of effort into figuring out possible scenarios for the future. We argue that the exploration of this direction is still in an early stage in the NLP research. To this end, we propose three argument generation tasks in the financial application scenario. Our experimental results show these tasks are still big challenges for representative generation models. Based on our empirical results, we further point out several unresolved issues and challenges in this research direction.

For reinforcement learning systems to be widely adopted, their users must understand and trust them. We present a theoretical analysis of explaining reinforcement learning using Shapley values, following a principled approach from game theory for identifying the contribution of individual players to the outcome of a cooperative game. We call this general framework Shapley Values for Explaining Reinforcement Learning (SVERL). Our analysis exposes the limitations of earlier uses of Shapley values in reinforcement learning. We then develop an approach that uses Shapley values to explain agent performance. In a variety of domains, SVERL produces meaningful explanations that match and supplement human intuition.

Markets and policymakers around the world hang on the consequential monetary policy decisions made by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Publicly available textual documentation of their meetings provides insight into members' attitudes about the economy. We use GPT-4 to quantify dissent among members on the topic of inflation. We find that transcripts and minutes reflect the diversity of member views about the macroeconomic outlook in a way that is lost or omitted from the public statements. In fact, diverging opinions that shed light upon the committee's "true" attitudes are almost entirely omitted from the final statements. Hence, we argue that forecasting FOMC sentiment based solely on statements will not sufficiently reflect dissent among the hawks and doves.

Most economic theories typically assume that financial market participants are fully rational individuals and use mathematical models to simulate human behavior in financial markets. However, human behavior is often not entirely rational and is challenging to predict accurately with mathematical models. In this paper, we propose Agent-based Simulated Financial Market (ASFM), which first constructs a simulated stock market with a real order matching system. Then, we propose a large language model based agent as the stock trader, which contains the profile, observation, and tool-learning based action module. The trading agent can comprehensively understand current market dynamics and financial policy information, and make decisions that align with their trading strategy. In the experiments, we first verify that the reactions of our ASFM are consistent with the real stock market in two controllable scenarios. In addition, we also conduct experiments in two popular economics research directions, and we find that conclusions drawn in our \model align with the preliminary findings in economics research. Based on these observations, we believe our proposed ASFM provides a new paradigm for economic research.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

Most learning algorithms with formal regret guarantees assume that no mistake is irreparable and essentially rely on trying all possible behaviors. This approach is problematic when some mistakes are catastrophic, i.e., irreparable. We propose an online learning problem where the goal is to minimize the chance of catastrophe. Specifically, we assume that the payoff in each round represents the chance of avoiding catastrophe that round and aim to maximize the product of payoffs (the overall chance of avoiding catastrophe) while allowing a limited number of queries to a mentor. We first show that in general, any algorithm either constantly queries the mentor or is nearly guaranteed to cause catastrophe. However, in settings where the mentor policy class is learnable in the standard online learning model, we provide an algorithm whose regret and rate of querying the mentor both approach 0 as the time horizon grows. Conceptually, if a policy class is learnable in the absence of catastrophic risk, it is learnable in the presence of catastrophic risk if the agent can ask for help.

The lottery ticket hypothesis (Frankle and Carbin, 2018), states that a randomly-initialized network contains a small subnetwork such that, when trained in isolation, can compete with the performance of the original network. We prove an even stronger hypothesis (as was also conjectured in Ramanujan et al., 2019), showing that for every bounded distribution and every target network with bounded weights, a sufficiently over-parameterized neural network with random weights contains a subnetwork with roughly the same accuracy as the target network, without any further training.

The game show Lucky 13 differs from other television game shows in that contestants are required to place a bet on their own knowledge of trivia by selecting a range that contains the number of questions that they answered correctly. We present a model for this game show using binomial random variables and generate tables outlining the optimal range the player should select based on maximization of two different utility functions. After analyzing the decisions made by some actual contestants on this show, we present a numerical simulation for how many questions an average player is expected to answer correctly based on question categories observed for two sample contestants.

Future- or return-conditioned supervised learning is an emerging paradigm for offline reinforcement learning (RL), where the future outcome (i.e., return) associated with an observed action sequence is used as input to a policy trained to imitate those same actions. While return-conditioning is at the heart of popular algorithms such as decision transformer (DT), these methods tend to perform poorly in highly stochastic environments, where an occasional high return can arise from randomness in the environment rather than the actions themselves. Such situations can lead to a learned policy that is inconsistent with its conditioning inputs; i.e., using the policy to act in the environment, when conditioning on a specific desired return, leads to a distribution of real returns that is wildly different than desired. In this work, we propose the dichotomy of control (DoC), a future-conditioned supervised learning framework that separates mechanisms within a policy's control (actions) from those beyond a policy's control (environment stochasticity). We achieve this separation by conditioning the policy on a latent variable representation of the future, and designing a mutual information constraint that removes any information from the latent variable associated with randomness in the environment. Theoretically, we show that DoC yields policies that are consistent with their conditioning inputs, ensuring that conditioning a learned policy on a desired high-return future outcome will correctly induce high-return behavior. Empirically, we show that DoC is able to achieve significantly better performance than DT on environments that have highly stochastic rewards and transition

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a dominating strategy in steering Language Models (LMs) towards human values/goals. The key to the strategy is employing a reward model ({varphi}) which can reflect a latent reward model with humans. While this strategy has proven to be effective, the training methodology requires a lot of human preference annotation (usually of the order of tens of thousands) to train {varphi}. Such large-scale preference annotations can be achievable if the reward model can be ubiquitously used. However, human values/goals are subjective and depend on the nature of the task. This poses a challenge in collecting diverse preferences for downstream applications. To address this, we propose a novel methodology to infuse domain knowledge into {varphi}, which reduces the size of preference annotation required. We validate our approach in E-Commerce Opinion Summarization, with a significant reduction in dataset size (just 940 samples) while advancing the state-of-the-art. Our contributions include a novel Reward Modelling technique, a new dataset (PromptOpinSumm) for Opinion Summarization, and a human preference dataset (OpinPref). The proposed methodology opens avenues for efficient RLHF, making it more adaptable to diverse applications with varying human values. We release the artifacts for usage under MIT License.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

The utility of reinforcement learning is limited by the alignment of reward functions with the interests of human stakeholders. One promising method for alignment is to learn the reward function from human-generated preferences between pairs of trajectory segments, a type of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). These human preferences are typically assumed to be informed solely by partial return, the sum of rewards along each segment. We find this assumption to be flawed and propose modeling human preferences instead as informed by each segment's regret, a measure of a segment's deviation from optimal decision-making. Given infinitely many preferences generated according to regret, we prove that we can identify a reward function equivalent to the reward function that generated those preferences, and we prove that the previous partial return model lacks this identifiability property in multiple contexts. We empirically show that our proposed regret preference model outperforms the partial return preference model with finite training data in otherwise the same setting. Additionally, we find that our proposed regret preference model better predicts real human preferences and also learns reward functions from these preferences that lead to policies that are better human-aligned. Overall, this work establishes that the choice of preference model is impactful, and our proposed regret preference model provides an improvement upon a core assumption of recent research. We have open sourced our experimental code, the human preferences dataset we gathered, and our training and preference elicitation interfaces for gathering a such a dataset.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a crucial technology for aligning language models with human values and intentions, enabling models to produce more helpful and harmless responses. Reward models are trained as proxies for human preferences to drive reinforcement learning optimization. While reward models are often considered central to achieving high performance, they face the following challenges in practical applications: (1) Incorrect and ambiguous preference pairs in the dataset may hinder the reward model from accurately capturing human intent. (2) Reward models trained on data from a specific distribution often struggle to generalize to examples outside that distribution and are not suitable for iterative RLHF training. In this report, we attempt to address these two issues. (1) From a data perspective, we propose a method to measure the strength of preferences within the data, based on a voting mechanism of multiple reward models. Experimental results confirm that data with varying preference strengths have different impacts on reward model performance. We introduce a series of novel methods to mitigate the influence of incorrect and ambiguous preferences in the dataset and fully leverage high-quality preference data. (2) From an algorithmic standpoint, we introduce contrastive learning to enhance the ability of reward models to distinguish between chosen and rejected responses, thereby improving model generalization. Furthermore, we employ meta-learning to enable the reward model to maintain the ability to differentiate subtle differences in out-of-distribution samples, and this approach can be utilized for iterative RLHF optimization.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

Learning from human feedback (LHF) -- and in particular learning from pairwise preferences -- has recently become a crucial ingredient in training large language models (LLMs), and has been the subject of much research. Most recent works frame it as a reinforcement learning problem, where a reward function is learned from pairwise preference data and the LLM is treated as a policy which is adapted to maximize the rewards, often under additional regularization constraints. We propose an alternative interpretation which centers on the generative process for pairwise preferences and treats LHF as a density estimation problem. We provide theoretical and empirical results showing that for a family of generative processes defined via preference behavior distribution equations, training a reward function on pairwise preferences effectively models an annotator's implicit preference distribution. Finally, we discuss and present findings on "annotator misspecification" -- failure cases where wrong modeling assumptions are made about annotator behavior, resulting in poorly-adapted models -- suggesting that approaches that learn from pairwise human preferences could have trouble learning from a population of annotators with diverse viewpoints.

We introduce a novel framework for simulating macroeconomic expectation formation using Large Language Model-Empowered Agents (LLM Agents). By constructing thousands of LLM Agents equipped with modules for personal characteristics, prior expectations, and knowledge, we replicate a survey experiment involving households and experts on inflation and unemployment. Our results show that although the expectations and thoughts generated by LLM Agents are more homogeneous than those of human participants, they still effectively capture key heterogeneity across agents and the underlying drivers of expectation formation. Furthermore, a module-ablation exercise highlights the critical role of prior expectations in simulating such heterogeneity. This approach complements traditional survey methods and offers new insights into AI behavioral science in macroeconomic research.

We propose a general methodology for recovering preference parameters from data on choices and response times. Our methods yield estimates with fast (1/n for n data points) convergence rates when specialized to the popular Drift Diffusion Model (DDM), but are broadly applicable to generalizations of the DDM as well as to alternative models of decision making that make use of response time data. The paper develops an empirical application to an experiment on intertemporal choice, showing that the use of response times delivers predictive accuracy and matters for the estimation of economically relevant parameters.

In this paper, we introduce the Preselection Bandit problem, in which the learner preselects a subset of arms (choice alternatives) for a user, which then chooses the final arm from this subset. The learner is not aware of the user's preferences, but can learn them from observed choices. In our concrete setting, we allow these choices to be stochastic and model the user's actions by means of the Plackett-Luce model. The learner's main task is to preselect subsets that eventually lead to highly preferred choices. To formalize this goal, we introduce a reasonable notion of regret and derive lower bounds on the expected regret. Moreover, we propose algorithms for which the upper bound on expected regret matches the lower bound up to a logarithmic term of the time horizon.

The prevalent deployment of learning from human preferences through reinforcement learning (RLHF) relies on two important approximations: the first assumes that pairwise preferences can be substituted with pointwise rewards. The second assumes that a reward model trained on these pointwise rewards can generalize from collected data to out-of-distribution data sampled by the policy. Recently, Direct Preference Optimisation (DPO) has been proposed as an approach that bypasses the second approximation and learn directly a policy from collected data without the reward modelling stage. However, this method still heavily relies on the first approximation. In this paper we try to gain a deeper theoretical understanding of these practical algorithms. In particular we derive a new general objective called PsiPO for learning from human preferences that is expressed in terms of pairwise preferences and therefore bypasses both approximations. This new general objective allows us to perform an in-depth analysis of the behavior of RLHF and DPO (as special cases of PsiPO) and to identify their potential pitfalls. We then consider another special case for PsiPO by setting Psi simply to Identity, for which we can derive an efficient optimisation procedure, prove performance guarantees and demonstrate its empirical superiority to DPO on some illustrative examples.

We consider the problem of preference based reinforcement learning (PbRL), where, unlike traditional reinforcement learning, an agent receives feedback only in terms of a 1 bit (0/1) preference over a trajectory pair instead of absolute rewards for them. The success of the traditional RL framework crucially relies on the underlying agent-reward model, which, however, depends on how accurately a system designer can express an appropriate reward function and often a non-trivial task. The main novelty of our framework is the ability to learn from preference-based trajectory feedback that eliminates the need to hand-craft numeric reward models. This paper sets up a formal framework for the PbRL problem with non-markovian rewards, where the trajectory preferences are encoded by a generalized linear model of dimension d. Assuming the transition model is known, we then propose an algorithm with almost optimal regret guarantee of mathcal{O}left( SH d log (T / delta) T right). We further, extend the above algorithm to the case of unknown transition dynamics, and provide an algorithm with near optimal regret guarantee mathcal{O}((d + H^2 + |S|)dT +|mathcal{S||A|TH} ). To the best of our knowledge, our work is one of the first to give tight regret guarantees for preference based RL problems with trajectory preferences.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

While Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is increasingly expanding more areas of application, little has been applied to make deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) more comprehensible. As RL becomes ubiquitous and used in critical and general public applications, it is essential to develop methods that make it better understood and more interpretable. This study proposes a novel approach to explain cooperative strategies in multiagent RL using Shapley values, a game theory concept used in XAI that successfully explains the rationale behind decisions taken by Machine Learning algorithms. Through testing common assumptions of this technique in two cooperation-centered socially challenging multi-agent environments environments, this article argues that Shapley values are a pertinent way to evaluate the contribution of players in a cooperative multi-agent RL context. To palliate the high overhead of this method, Shapley values are approximated using Monte Carlo sampling. Experimental results on Multiagent Particle and Sequential Social Dilemmas show that Shapley values succeed at estimating the contribution of each agent. These results could have implications that go beyond games in economics, (e.g., for non-discriminatory decision making, ethical and responsible AI-derived decisions or policy making under fairness constraints). They also expose how Shapley values only give general explanations about a model and cannot explain a single run, episode nor justify precise actions taken by agents. Future work should focus on addressing these critical aspects.

We seek to understand fundamental tradeoffs between the accuracy of prior information that a learner has on a given problem and its learning performance. We introduce the notion of prioritized risk, which differs from traditional notions of minimax and Bayes risk by allowing us to study such fundamental tradeoffs in settings where reality does not necessarily conform to the learner's prior. We present a general reduction-based approach for extending classical minimax lower-bound techniques in order to lower bound the prioritized risk for statistical estimation problems. We also introduce a novel generalization of Fano's inequality (which may be of independent interest) for lower bounding the prioritized risk in more general settings involving unbounded losses. We illustrate the ability of our framework to provide insights into tradeoffs between prior information and learning performance for problems in estimation, regression, and reinforcement learning.

It is well known that accurate probabilistic predictors can be trained through empirical risk minimisation with proper scoring rules as loss functions. While such learners capture so-called aleatoric uncertainty of predictions, various machine learning methods have recently been developed with the goal to let the learner also represent its epistemic uncertainty, i.e., the uncertainty caused by a lack of knowledge and data. An emerging branch of the literature proposes the use of a second-order learner that provides predictions in terms of distributions on probability distributions. However, recent work has revealed serious theoretical shortcomings for second-order predictors based on loss minimisation. In this paper, we generalise these findings and prove a more fundamental result: There seems to be no loss function that provides an incentive for a second-order learner to faithfully represent its epistemic uncertainty in the same manner as proper scoring rules do for standard (first-order) learners. As a main mathematical tool to prove this result, we introduce the generalised notion of second-order scoring rules.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has opened up exciting possibilities for simulating human behavior and cognitive processes, with potential applications in various domains, including marketing research and consumer behavior analysis. However, the validity of utilizing LLMs as stand-ins for human subjects remains uncertain due to glaring divergences that suggest fundamentally different underlying processes at play and the sensitivity of LLM responses to prompt variations. This paper presents a novel approach based on Shapley values from cooperative game theory to interpret LLM behavior and quantify the relative contribution of each prompt component to the model's output. Through two applications - a discrete choice experiment and an investigation of cognitive biases - we demonstrate how the Shapley value method can uncover what we term "token noise" effects, a phenomenon where LLM decisions are disproportionately influenced by tokens providing minimal informative content. This phenomenon raises concerns about the robustness and generalizability of insights obtained from LLMs in the context of human behavior simulation. Our model-agnostic approach extends its utility to proprietary LLMs, providing a valuable tool for practitioners and researchers to strategically optimize prompts and mitigate apparent cognitive biases. Our findings underscore the need for a more nuanced understanding of the factors driving LLM responses before relying on them as substitutes for human subjects in survey settings. We emphasize the importance of researchers reporting results conditioned on specific prompt templates and exercising caution when drawing parallels between human behavior and LLMs.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a powerful technique to make large language models (LLMs) easier to use and more effective. A core piece of the RLHF process is the training and utilization of a model of human preferences that acts as a reward function for optimization. This approach, which operates at the intersection of many stakeholders and academic disciplines, remains poorly understood. RLHF reward models are often cited as being central to achieving performance, yet very few descriptors of capabilities, evaluations, training methods, or open-source models exist. Given this lack of information, further study and transparency is needed for learned RLHF reward models. In this paper, we illustrate the complex history of optimizing preferences, and articulate lines of inquiry to understand the sociotechnical context of reward models. In particular, we highlight the ontological differences between costs, rewards, and preferences at stake in RLHF's foundations, related methodological tensions, and possible research directions to improve general understanding of how reward models function.

There has been considerable recent interest in scoring properties on the basis of eviction risk. The success of methods for eviction prediction is typically evaluated using different measures of predictive accuracy. However, the underlying goal of such prediction is to direct appropriate assistance to households that may be at greater risk so they remain stably housed. Thus, we must ask the question of how useful such predictions are in targeting outreach efforts - informing action. In this paper, we investigate this question using a novel dataset that matches information on properties, evictions, and owners. We perform an eviction prediction task to produce risk scores and then use these risk scores to plan targeted outreach policies. We show that the risk scores are, in fact, useful, enabling a theoretical team of caseworkers to reach more eviction-prone properties in the same amount of time, compared to outreach policies that are either neighborhood-based or focus on buildings with a recent history of evictions. We also discuss the importance of neighborhood and ownership features in both risk prediction and targeted outreach.

We examine the potential of ChatGPT and other large language models in predicting stock market returns using news headlines. We use ChatGPT to assess whether each headline is good, bad, or neutral for firms' stock prices. We document a significantly positive correlation between ChatGPT scores and subsequent daily stock returns. We find that ChatGPT outperforms traditional sentiment analysis methods. More basic models such as GPT-1, GPT-2, and BERT cannot accurately forecast returns, indicating return predictability is an emerging capacity of complex language models. Long-short strategies based on ChatGPT-4 deliver the highest Sharpe ratio. Furthermore, we find predictability in both small and large stocks, suggesting market underreaction to company news. Predictability is stronger among smaller stocks and stocks with bad news, consistent with limits-to-arbitrage also playing an important role. Finally, we propose a new method to evaluate and understand the models' reasoning capabilities. Overall, our results suggest that incorporating advanced language models into the investment decision-making process can yield more accurate predictions and enhance the performance of quantitative trading strategies.

We study preferential Bayesian optimization (BO) where reliable feedback is limited to pairwise comparison called duels. An important challenge in preferential BO, which uses the preferential Gaussian process (GP) model to represent flexible preference structure, is that the posterior distribution is a computationally intractable skew GP. The most widely used approach for preferential BO is Gaussian approximation, which ignores the skewness of the true posterior. Alternatively, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) based preferential BO is also proposed. In this work, we first verify the accuracy of Gaussian approximation, from which we reveal the critical problem that the predictive probability of duels can be inaccurate. This observation motivates us to improve the MCMC-based estimation for skew GP, for which we show the practical efficiency of Gibbs sampling and derive the low variance MC estimator. However, the computational time of MCMC can still be a bottleneck in practice. Towards building a more practical preferential BO, we develop a new method that achieves both high computational efficiency and low sample complexity, and then demonstrate its effectiveness through extensive numerical experiments.

The rapid progress in generative models has resulted in impressive leaps in generation quality, blurring the lines between synthetic and real data. Web-scale datasets are now prone to the inevitable contamination by synthetic data, directly impacting the training of future generated models. Already, some theoretical results on self-consuming generative models (a.k.a., iterative retraining) have emerged in the literature, showcasing that either model collapse or stability could be possible depending on the fraction of generated data used at each retraining step. However, in practice, synthetic data is often subject to human feedback and curated by users before being used and uploaded online. For instance, many interfaces of popular text-to-image generative models, such as Stable Diffusion or Midjourney, produce several variations of an image for a given query which can eventually be curated by the users. In this paper, we theoretically study the impact of data curation on iterated retraining of generative models and show that it can be seen as an implicit preference optimization mechanism. However, unlike standard preference optimization, the generative model does not have access to the reward function or negative samples needed for pairwise comparisons. Moreover, our study doesn't require access to the density function, only to samples. We prove that, if the data is curated according to a reward model, then the expected reward of the iterative retraining procedure is maximized. We further provide theoretical results on the stability of the retraining loop when using a positive fraction of real data at each step. Finally, we conduct illustrative experiments on both synthetic datasets and on CIFAR10 showing that such a procedure amplifies biases of the reward model.

In this paper, we explore the ability to model and infer personality types of opponents, predict their responses, and use this information to adapt a dialog agent's high-level strategy in negotiation tasks. Inspired by the idea of incorporating a theory of mind (ToM) into machines, we introduce a probabilistic formulation to encapsulate the opponent's personality type during both learning and inference. We test our approach on the CraigslistBargain dataset and show that our method using ToM inference achieves a 20% higher dialog agreement rate compared to baselines on a mixed population of opponents. We also find that our model displays diverse negotiation behavior with different types of opponents.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) aims to infer an agent's preferences (represented as a reward function R) from their behaviour (represented as a policy pi). To do this, we need a behavioural model of how pi relates to R. In the current literature, the most common behavioural models are optimality, Boltzmann-rationality, and causal entropy maximisation. However, the true relationship between a human's preferences and their behaviour is much more complex than any of these behavioural models. This means that the behavioural models are misspecified, which raises the concern that they may lead to systematic errors if applied to real data. In this paper, we analyse how sensitive the IRL problem is to misspecification of the behavioural model. Specifically, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions that completely characterise how the observed data may differ from the assumed behavioural model without incurring an error above a given threshold. In addition to this, we also characterise the conditions under which a behavioural model is robust to small perturbations of the observed policy, and we analyse how robust many behavioural models are to misspecification of their parameter values (such as e.g.\ the discount rate). Our analysis suggests that the IRL problem is highly sensitive to misspecification, in the sense that very mild misspecification can lead to very large errors in the inferred reward function.

The stock market is a network which provides a platform for almost all major economic transactions. While investing in the stock market is a good idea, investing in individual stocks may not be, especially for the casual investor. Smart stock-picking requires in-depth research and plenty of dedication. Predicting this stock value offers enormous arbitrage profit opportunities. This attractiveness of finding a solution has prompted researchers to find a way past problems like volatility, seasonality, and dependence on time. This paper surveys recent literature in the domain of natural language processing and machine learning techniques used to predict stock market movements. The main contributions of this paper include the sophisticated categorizations of many recent articles and the illustration of the recent trends of research in stock market prediction and its related areas.

In many real-world sequential decision-making problems, an action does not immediately reflect on the feedback and spreads its effects over a long time frame. For instance, in online advertising, investing in a platform produces an instantaneous increase of awareness, but the actual reward, i.e., a conversion, might occur far in the future. Furthermore, whether a conversion takes place depends on: how fast the awareness grows, its vanishing effects, and the synergy or interference with other advertising platforms. Previous work has investigated the Multi-Armed Bandit framework with the possibility of delayed and aggregated feedback, without a particular structure on how an action propagates in the future, disregarding possible dynamical effects. In this paper, we introduce a novel setting, the Dynamical Linear Bandits (DLB), an extension of the linear bandits characterized by a hidden state. When an action is performed, the learner observes a noisy reward whose mean is a linear function of the hidden state and of the action. Then, the hidden state evolves according to linear dynamics, affected by the performed action too. We start by introducing the setting, discussing the notion of optimal policy, and deriving an expected regret lower bound. Then, we provide an optimistic regret minimization algorithm, Dynamical Linear Upper Confidence Bound (DynLin-UCB), that suffers an expected regret of order mathcal{O} Big( d sqrt{T}{(1-rho)^{3/2}} Big), where rho is a measure of the stability of the system, and d is the dimension of the action vector. Finally, we conduct a numerical validation on a synthetic environment and on real-world data to show the effectiveness of DynLin-UCB in comparison with several baselines.

The reward hypothesis posits that, "all of what we mean by goals and purposes can be well thought of as maximization of the expected value of the cumulative sum of a received scalar signal (reward)." We aim to fully settle this hypothesis. This will not conclude with a simple affirmation or refutation, but rather specify completely the implicit requirements on goals and purposes under which the hypothesis holds.

Adaptive behavior often requires predicting future events. The theory of reinforcement learning prescribes what kinds of predictive representations are useful and how to compute them. This paper integrates these theoretical ideas with work on cognition and neuroscience. We pay special attention to the successor representation (SR) and its generalizations, which have been widely applied both as engineering tools and models of brain function. This convergence suggests that particular kinds of predictive representations may function as versatile building blocks of intelligence.

Counterfactual explanations are attracting significant attention due to the flourishing applications of machine learning models in consequential domains. A counterfactual plan consists of multiple possibilities to modify a given instance so that the model's prediction will be altered. As the predictive model can be updated subject to the future arrival of new data, a counterfactual plan may become ineffective or infeasible with respect to the future values of the model parameters. In this work, we study the counterfactual plans under model uncertainty, in which the distribution of the model parameters is partially prescribed using only the first- and second-moment information. First, we propose an uncertainty quantification tool to compute the lower and upper bounds of the probability of validity for any given counterfactual plan. We then provide corrective methods to adjust the counterfactual plan to improve the validity measure. The numerical experiments validate our bounds and demonstrate that our correction increases the robustness of the counterfactual plans in different real-world datasets.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), which derives reward signals directly from pairwise preference data, has shown its effectiveness on aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences. Despite its widespread use across various tasks, DPO has been criticized for its sensitivity to the SFT's effectiveness and its hindrance to the learning capacity towards human-preferred responses, leading to less satisfactory performance. To overcome those limitations, the theoretical understanding of DPO are indispensable but still lacking. To this end, we take a step towards theoretically analyzing and understanding the limitations of DPO. Specifically, we provide an analytical framework using the field theory to analyze the optimization process of DPO. By analyzing the gradient vector field of the DPO loss function, we find that the DPO loss function decreases the probability of producing human dispreferred data at a faster rate than it increases the probability of producing preferred data. This provides theoretical insights for understanding the limitations of DPO discovered in the related research experiments, thereby setting the foundation for its improvement.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback plays a crucial role in aligning language models towards human preferences, traditionally represented through comparisons between pairs or sets of responses within a given context. While many studies have enhanced algorithmic techniques to optimize learning from such data, this work shifts focus to improving preference learning through a data-centric approach. Specifically, we propose enriching existing preference datasets with machine-generated rationales that explain the reasons behind choices. We develop a simple and principled framework to augment current preference learning methods with rationale information. Our comprehensive analysis highlights how rationales enhance learning efficiency. Extensive experiments reveal that rationale-enriched preference learning offers multiple advantages: it improves data efficiency, accelerates convergence to higher-performing models, and reduces verbosity bias and hallucination. Furthermore, this framework is versatile enough to integrate with various preference optimization algorithms. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of re-imagining data design for preference learning, demonstrating that even freely available machine-generated rationales can significantly boost performance across multiple dimensions. The code repository is available at https: //github.com/reds-lab/preference-learning-with-rationales

We consider tackling a single-agent RL problem by distributing it to n learners. These learners, called advisors, endeavour to solve the problem from a different focus. Their advice, taking the form of action values, is then communicated to an aggregator, which is in control of the system. We show that the local planning method for the advisors is critical and that none of the ones found in the literature is flawless: the egocentric planning overestimates values of states where the other advisors disagree, and the agnostic planning is inefficient around danger zones. We introduce a novel approach called empathic and discuss its theoretical aspects. We empirically examine and validate our theoretical findings on a fruit collection task.

This paper analyzes how expectations of Transformative AI (TAI) affect current economic behavior by introducing a novel mechanism where automation redirects labor income from workers to those controlling AI systems, with the share of automated labor controlled by each household depending on their wealth at the time of invention. Using a modified neoclassical growth model calibrated to contemporary AI timeline forecasts, I find that even moderate assumptions about wealth-based allocation of AI labor generate substantial increases in pre-TAI interest rates. Under baseline scenarios with proportional wealth-based allocation, one-year interest rates rise to 10-16% compared to approximately 3% without strategic competition. The model reveals a notable divergence between interest rates and capital rental rates, as households accept lower productive returns in exchange for the strategic value of wealth accumulation. These findings suggest that evolving beliefs about TAI could create significant upward pressure on interest rates well before any technological breakthrough occurs, with important implications for monetary policy and financial stability.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

In this work, we explore the possibility of utilizing transfer learning techniques to address the financial portfolio optimization problem. We introduce a novel concept called "transfer risk", within the optimization framework of transfer learning. A series of numerical experiments are conducted from three categories: cross-continent transfer, cross-sector transfer, and cross-frequency transfer. In particular, 1. a strong correlation between the transfer risk and the overall performance of transfer learning methods is established, underscoring the significance of transfer risk as a viable indicator of "transferability"; 2. transfer risk is shown to provide a computationally efficient way to identify appropriate source tasks in transfer learning, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the transfer learning approach; 3. additionally, the numerical experiments offer valuable new insights for portfolio management across these different settings.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Many poker systems, whether created with heuristics or machine learning, rely on the probability of winning as a key input. However calculating the precise probability using combinatorics is an intractable problem, so instead we approximate it. Monte Carlo simulation is an effective technique that can be used to approximate the probability that a player will win and/or tie a hand. However, without the use of a memory-intensive lookup table or a supercomputer, it becomes infeasible to run millions of times when training an agent with self-play. To combat the space-time tradeoff, we use deep learning to approximate the probabilities obtained from the Monte Carlo simulation with high accuracy. The learned model proves to be a lightweight alternative to Monte Carlo simulation, which ultimately allows us to use the probabilities as inputs during self-play efficiently. The source code and optimized neural network can be found at https://github.com/brandinho/Poker-Probability-Approximation

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have enabled powerful agent-based applications in finance, particularly for sentiment analysis, financial report comprehension, and stock forecasting. However, existing systems often lack inter-agent coordination, structured self-reflection, and access to high-quality, domain-specific post-training data such as data from trading activities including both market conditions and agent decisions. These data are crucial for agents to understand the market dynamics, improve the quality of decision-making and promote effective coordination. We introduce TradingGroup, a multi-agent trading system designed to address these limitations through a self-reflective architecture and an end-to-end data-synthesis pipeline. TradingGroup consists of specialized agents for news sentiment analysis, financial report interpretation, stock trend forecasting, trading style adaptation, and a trading decision making agent that merges all signals and style preferences to produce buy, sell or hold decisions. Specifically, we design self-reflection mechanisms for the stock forecasting, style, and decision-making agents to distill past successes and failures for similar reasoning in analogous future scenarios and a dynamic risk-management model to offer configurable dynamic stop-loss and take-profit mechanisms. In addition, TradingGroup embeds an automated data-synthesis and annotation pipeline that generates high-quality post-training data for further improving the agent performance through post-training. Our backtesting experiments across five real-world stock datasets demonstrate TradingGroup's superior performance over rule-based, machine learning, reinforcement learning, and existing LLM-based trading strategies.

Designing robust frameworks for precise prediction of future prices of stocks has always been considered a very challenging research problem. The advocates of the classical efficient market hypothesis affirm that it is impossible to accurately predict the future prices in an efficiently operating market due to the stochastic nature of the stock price variables. However, numerous propositions exist in the literature with varying degrees of sophistication and complexity that illustrate how algorithms and models can be designed for making efficient, accurate, and robust predictions of stock prices. We present a gamut of ten deep learning models of regression for precise and robust prediction of the future prices of the stock of a critical company in the auto sector of India. Using a very granular stock price collected at 5 minutes intervals, we train the models based on the records from 31st Dec, 2012 to 27th Dec, 2013. The testing of the models is done using records from 30th Dec, 2013 to 9th Jan 2015. We explain the design principles of the models and analyze the results of their performance based on accuracy in forecasting and speed of execution.

Detecting AI risks becomes more challenging as stronger models emerge and find novel methods such as Alignment Faking to circumvent these detection attempts. Inspired by how risky behaviors in humans (i.e., illegal activities that may hurt others) are sometimes guided by strongly-held values, we believe that identifying values within AI models can be an early warning system for AI's risky behaviors. We create LitmusValues, an evaluation pipeline to reveal AI models' priorities on a range of AI value classes. Then, we collect AIRiskDilemmas, a diverse collection of dilemmas that pit values against one another in scenarios relevant to AI safety risks such as Power Seeking. By measuring an AI model's value prioritization using its aggregate choices, we obtain a self-consistent set of predicted value priorities that uncover potential risks. We show that values in LitmusValues (including seemingly innocuous ones like Care) can predict for both seen risky behaviors in AIRiskDilemmas and unseen risky behaviors in HarmBench.

When individuals encounter observations that violate their expectations, when will they adjust their expectations and when will they maintain them despite these observations? For example, when individuals expect objects of type A to be smaller than objects B, but observe the opposite, when will they adjust their expectation about the relationship between the two objects (to A being larger than B)? Naively, one would predict that the larger the violation, the greater the adaptation. However, experiments reveal that when violations are extreme, individuals are more likely to hold on to their prior expectations rather than adjust them. To address this puzzle, we tested the adaptation of artificial neural networks (ANNs) capable of relational learning and found a similar phenomenon: Standard learning dynamics dictates that small violations would lead to adjustments of expected relations while larger ones would be resolved using a different mechanism -- a change in object representation that bypasses the need for adaptation of the relational expectations. These results suggest that the experimentally-observed stability of prior expectations when facing large expectation violations is a natural consequence of learning dynamics and does not require any additional mechanisms. We conclude by discussing the effect of intermediate adaptation steps on this stability.

The Monty Hall problem is a classic probability puzzle known for its counterintuitive solution, revealing fundamental discrepancies between mathematical reasoning and human intuition. To bridge this gap, we introduce a novel explanatory framework inspired by quantum measurement theory. Specifically, we conceptualize the hosts' actions-opening doors to reveal non-prizes-as analogous to quantum measurements that cause asymmetric collapses of the probability distribution. This quantum-inspired interpretation not only clarifies why the intuitive misunderstanding arises but also provides generalized formulas consistent with standard Bayesian results. We further validate our analytical approach using Monte Carlo simulations across various problem settings, demonstrating precise agreement between theoretical predictions and empirical outcomes. Our quantum analogy thus offers a powerful pedagogical tool, enhancing intuitive understanding of conditional probability phenomena through the lens of probability redistribution and quantum-like measurement operations.

We resolve an open problem of Hanneke on the subject of universally consistent online learning with non-i.i.d. processes and unbounded losses. The notion of an optimistically universal learning rule was defined by Hanneke in an effort to study learning theory under minimal assumptions. A given learning rule is said to be optimistically universal if it achieves a low long-run average loss whenever the data generating process makes this goal achievable by some learning rule. Hanneke posed as an open problem whether, for every unbounded loss, the family of processes admitting universal learning are precisely those having a finite number of distinct values almost surely. In this paper, we completely resolve this problem, showing that this is indeed the case. As a consequence, this also offers a dramatically simpler formulation of an optimistically universal learning rule for any unbounded loss: namely, the simple memorization rule already suffices. Our proof relies on constructing random measurable partitions of the instance space and could be of independent interest for solving other open questions. We extend the results to the non-realizable setting thereby providing an optimistically universal Bayes consistent learning rule.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has demonstrated great promise in aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preference. Depending on the availability of preference data, both online and offline RLHF are active areas of investigation. A key bottleneck is understanding how to incorporate uncertainty estimation in the reward function learned from the preference data for RLHF, regardless of how the preference data is collected. While the principles of optimism or pessimism under uncertainty are well-established in standard reinforcement learning (RL), a practically-implementable and theoretically-grounded form amenable to large language models is not yet available, as standard techniques for constructing confidence intervals become intractable under arbitrary policy parameterizations. In this paper, we introduce a unified approach to online and offline RLHF -- value-incentivized preference optimization (VPO) -- which regularizes the maximum-likelihood estimate of the reward function with the corresponding value function, modulated by a sign to indicate whether the optimism or pessimism is chosen. VPO also directly optimizes the policy with implicit reward modeling, and therefore shares a simpler RLHF pipeline similar to direct preference optimization. Theoretical guarantees of VPO are provided for both online and offline settings, matching the rates of their standard RL counterparts. Moreover, experiments on text summarization and dialog verify the practicality and effectiveness of VPO.

We study the problem of estimating the distribution of the return of a policy using an offline dataset that is not generated from the policy, i.e., distributional offline policy evaluation (OPE). We propose an algorithm called Fitted Likelihood Estimation (FLE), which conducts a sequence of Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and has the flexibility of integrating any state-of-the-art probabilistic generative models as long as it can be trained via MLE. FLE can be used for both finite-horizon and infinite-horizon discounted settings where rewards can be multi-dimensional vectors. Our theoretical results show that for both finite-horizon and infinite-horizon discounted settings, FLE can learn distributions that are close to the ground truth under total variation distance and Wasserstein distance, respectively. Our theoretical results hold under the conditions that the offline data covers the test policy's traces and that the supervised learning MLE procedures succeed. Experimentally, we demonstrate the performance of FLE with two generative models, Gaussian mixture models and diffusion models. For the multi-dimensional reward setting, FLE with diffusion models is capable of estimating the complicated distribution of the return of a test policy.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

Unitary quantum theory, having no Born Rule, is non-probabilistic. Hence the notorious problem of reconciling it with the unpredictability and appearance of stochasticity in quantum measurements. Generalising and improving upon the so-called 'decision-theoretic approach' (Deutsch, 1999; Wallace, 2003, 2007, 2012), I shall recast that problem in the recently proposed constructor theory of information - where quantum theory is represented as one of a class of superinformation theories, which are local, non-probabilistic theories conforming to certain constructor-theoretic conditions. I prove that the unpredictability of measurement outcomes (to which I give an exact meaning via constructor theory), necessarily arises in superinformation theories. Then I explain how the appearance of stochasticity in (finitely many) repeated measurements can arise under superinformation theories. And I establish sufficient conditions for a superinformation theory to inform decisions (made under it) as if it were probabilistic, via a Deutsch-Wallace-type argument - thus defining a class of decision-supporting superinformation theories. This broadens the domain of applicability of that argument to cover constructor-theory compliant theories. In addition, in this version some of the argument's assumptions, previously construed as merely decision-theoretic, follow from physical properties expressed by constructor-theoretic principles.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback usually models preferences using a reward model that does not distinguish between people. We argue that this is unlikely to be a good design choice in contexts with high potential for disagreement, like in the training of large language models. We propose a method to specialise a reward model to a person or group of people. Our approach builds on the observation that individual preferences can be captured as a linear combination of a set of general reward features. We show how to learn such features and subsequently use them to quickly adapt the reward model to a specific individual, even if their preferences are not reflected in the training data. We present experiments with large language models comparing the proposed architecture with a non-adaptive reward model and also adaptive counterparts, including models that do in-context personalisation. Depending on how much disagreement there is in the training data, our model either significantly outperforms the baselines or matches their performance with a simpler architecture and more stable training.

Recent advances in aligning Large Language Models with human preferences have benefited from larger reward models and better preference data. However, most of these methodologies rely on the accuracy of the reward model. The reward models used in Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) are typically learned from small datasets using stochastic optimization algorithms, making them prone to high variability. We illustrate the inconsistencies between reward models empirically on numerous open-source datasets. We theoretically show that the fluctuation of the reward models can be detrimental to the alignment problem because the derived policies are more overfitted to the reward model and, hence, are riskier if the reward model itself is uncertain. We use concentration of measure to motivate an uncertainty-aware, conservative algorithm for policy optimization. We show that such policies are more risk-averse in the sense that they are more cautious of uncertain rewards. We theoretically prove that our proposed methodology has less risk than the vanilla method. We corroborate our theoretical results with experiments based on designing an ensemble of reward models. We use this ensemble of reward models to align a language model using our methodology and observe that our empirical findings match our theoretical predictions.

We used a dataset of daily Bloomberg Financial Market Summaries from 2010 to 2023, reposted on large financial media, to determine how global news headlines may affect stock market movements using ChatGPT and a two-stage prompt approach. We document a statistically significant positive correlation between the sentiment score and future equity market returns over short to medium term, which reverts to a negative correlation over longer horizons. Validation of this correlation pattern across multiple equity markets indicates its robustness across equity regions and resilience to non-linearity, evidenced by comparison of Pearson and Spearman correlations. Finally, we provide an estimate of the optimal horizon that strikes a balance between reactivity to new information and correlation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via public-facing interfaces to interact with millions of users, each with diverse preferences. Despite this, preference tuning of LLMs predominantly relies on reward models trained using binary judgments where annotators select the preferred choice out of pairs of model outputs. In this work, we argue that this reliance on binary choices does not capture the broader, aggregate preferences of the target user in real-world tasks. We propose a taxonomy that identifies two dimensions of subjectivity where different users disagree on the preferred output-namely, the Plurality of Responses to Prompts, where prompts allow for multiple correct answers, and the Indistinguishability of Responses, where candidate outputs are paraphrases of each other. We show that reward models correlate weakly with user preferences in these cases. As a first step to address this issue, we introduce a simple yet effective method that augments existing binary preference datasets with synthetic preference judgments to estimate potential user disagreement. Incorporating these via a margin term as a form of regularization during model training yields predictions that better align with the aggregate user preferences.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

Iterative preference learning, though yielding superior performances, requires online annotated preference labels. In this work, we study strategies to select worth-annotating response pairs for cost-efficient annotation while achieving competitive or even better performances compared with the random selection baseline for iterative preference learning. Built on assumptions regarding uncertainty and distribution shifts, we propose a comparative view to rank the implicit reward margins as predicted by DPO to select the response pairs that yield more benefits. Through extensive experiments, we show that annotating those response pairs with small margins is generally better than large or random, under both single- and multi-iteration scenarios. Besides, our empirical results suggest allocating more annotation budgets in the earlier iterations rather than later across multiple iterations.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Can classical game-theoretic frameworks be extended to capture the bounded rationality and causal reasoning of AI agents? We investigate this question by extending Causal Normal Form Games (CNFGs) to sequential settings, introducing Sequential Causal Multi-Agent Systems (S-CMAS) that incorporate Pearl's Causal Hierarchy across leader-follower interactions. While theoretically elegant -- we prove PSPACE-completeness, develop equilibrium refinements, and establish connections to signaling theory -- our comprehensive empirical investigation reveals a critical limitation: S-CNE provides zero welfare improvement over classical Stackelberg equilibrium across all tested scenarios. Through 50+ Monte Carlo simulations and hand-crafted synthetic examples, we demonstrate that backward induction with rational best-response eliminates any strategic advantage from causal layer distinctions. We construct a theoretical example illustrating conditions where benefits could emerge (ε-rational satisficing followers), though implementation confirms that even relaxed rationality assumptions prove insufficient when good instincts align with optimal play. This negative result provides valuable insight: classical game-theoretic extensions grounded in rational choice are fundamentally incompatible with causal reasoning advantages, motivating new theoretical frameworks beyond standard Nash equilibrium for agentic AI.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a standard approach for fine-tuning large language models to follow instructions. As part of this process, learned reward models are used to approximately model human preferences. However, as imperfect representations of the "true" reward, these learned reward models are susceptible to overoptimization. Gao et al. (2023) studied this phenomenon in a synthetic human feedback setup with a significantly larger "gold" reward model acting as the true reward (instead of humans) and showed that overoptimization remains a persistent problem regardless of the size of the proxy reward model and training data used. Using a similar setup, we conduct a systematic study to evaluate the efficacy of using ensemble-based conservative optimization objectives, specifically worst-case optimization (WCO) and uncertainty-weighted optimization (UWO), for mitigating reward model overoptimization when using two optimization methods: (a) best-of-n sampling (BoN) (b) proximal policy optimization (PPO). We additionally extend the setup of Gao et al. (2023) to include 25% label noise to better mirror real-world conditions. Both with and without label noise, we find that conservative optimization practically eliminates overoptimization and improves performance by up to 70% for BoN sampling. For PPO, ensemble-based conservative optimization always reduces overoptimization and outperforms single reward model optimization. Moreover, combining it with a small KL penalty successfully prevents overoptimization at no performance cost. Overall, our results demonstrate that ensemble-based conservative optimization can effectively counter overoptimization.

Machine learning models in modern mass-market applications are often updated over time. One of the foremost challenges faced is that, despite increasing overall performance, these updates may flip specific model predictions in unpredictable ways. In practice, researchers quantify the number of unstable predictions between models pre and post update -- i.e., predictive churn. In this paper, we study this effect through the lens of predictive multiplicity -- i.e., the prevalence of conflicting predictions over the set of near-optimal models (the Rashomon set). We show how traditional measures of predictive multiplicity can be used to examine expected churn over this set of prospective models -- i.e., the set of models that may be used to replace a baseline model in deployment. We present theoretical results on the expected churn between models within the Rashomon set from different perspectives. And we characterize expected churn over model updates via the Rashomon set, pairing our analysis with empirical results on real-world datasets -- showing how our approach can be used to better anticipate, reduce, and avoid churn in consumer-facing applications. Further, we show that our approach is useful even for models enhanced with uncertainty awareness.

Neural scaling laws (NSL) refer to the phenomenon where model performance improves with scale. Sharma & Kaplan analyzed NSL using approximation theory and predict that MSE losses decay as N^{-alpha}, alpha=4/d, where N is the number of model parameters, and d is the intrinsic input dimension. Although their theory works well for some cases (e.g., ReLU networks), we surprisingly find that a simple 1D problem y=x^2 manifests a different scaling law (alpha=1) from their predictions (alpha=4). We opened the neural networks and found that the new scaling law originates from lottery ticket ensembling: a wider network on average has more "lottery tickets", which are ensembled to reduce the variance of outputs. We support the ensembling mechanism by mechanistically interpreting single neural networks, as well as studying them statistically. We attribute the N^{-1} scaling law to the "central limit theorem" of lottery tickets. Finally, we discuss its potential implications for large language models and statistical physics-type theories of learning.

A common approach for aligning language models to human preferences is to first learn a reward model from preference data, and then use this reward model to update the language model. We study two closely related problems that arise in this approach. First, any monotone transformation of the reward model preserves preference ranking; is there a choice that is ``better'' than others? Second, we often wish to align language models to multiple properties: how should we combine multiple reward models? Using a probabilistic interpretation of the alignment procedure, we identify a natural choice for transformation for (the common case of) rewards learned from Bradley-Terry preference models. This derived transformation has two important properties. First, it emphasizes improving poorly-performing outputs, rather than outputs that already score well. This mitigates both underfitting (where some prompts are not improved) and reward hacking (where the model learns to exploit misspecification of the reward model). Second, it enables principled aggregation of rewards by linking summation to logical conjunction: the sum of transformed rewards corresponds to the probability that the output is ``good'' in all measured properties, in a sense we make precise. Experiments aligning language models to be both helpful and harmless using RLHF show substantial improvements over the baseline (non-transformed) approach.

The stock market offers a platform where people buy and sell shares of publicly listed companies. Generally, stock prices are quite volatile; hence predicting them is a daunting task. There is still much research going to develop more accuracy in stock price prediction. Portfolio construction refers to the allocation of different sector stocks optimally to achieve a maximum return by taking a minimum risk. A good portfolio can help investors earn maximum profit by taking a minimum risk. Beginning with Dow Jones Theory a lot of advancement has happened in the area of building efficient portfolios. In this project, we have tried to predict the future value of a few stocks from six important sectors of the Indian economy and also built a portfolio. As part of the project, our team has conducted a study of the performance of various Time series, machine learning, and deep learning models in stock price prediction on selected stocks from the chosen six important sectors of the economy. As part of building an efficient portfolio, we have studied multiple portfolio optimization theories beginning with the Modern Portfolio theory. We have built a minimum variance portfolio and optimal risk portfolio for all the six chosen sectors by using the daily stock prices over the past five years as training data and have also conducted back testing to check the performance of the portfolio. We look forward to continuing our study in the area of stock price prediction and asset allocation and consider this project as the first stepping stone.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

Learning from preference feedback is a common practice for aligning large language models~(LLMs) with human value. Conventionally, preference data is learned and encoded into a scalar reward model that connects a value head with an LLM to produce a scalar score as preference or reward. However, scalar models lack interpretability and are known to be susceptible to biases in datasets. This paper investigates leveraging the generation capability of LLMs to address both limitations in one shot. Specifically, we prompt the pre-trained LLM to generate positive and negative judgments, both supported with rationales in natural language form. The self-generated contrastive judgment pairs are used to train the generative judge with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). This proposal of training the generative Judge using self-generated Contrastive judgments (Con-J) ensures natural interpretability due to the generated rationales together with the judgments, as well as high robustness against bias without the need for an additional reward head. Experimental results show that the performance of Con-J is comparable to the scalar reward model trained on the same collection of preference data, and demonstrate its superior interpretability and robustness in encoding human preferences.

We consider a class of assortment optimization problems in an offline data-driven setting. A firm does not know the underlying customer choice model but has access to an offline dataset consisting of the historically offered assortment set, customer choice, and revenue. The objective is to use the offline dataset to find an optimal assortment. Due to the combinatorial nature of assortment optimization, the problem of insufficient data coverage is likely to occur in the offline dataset. Therefore, designing a provably efficient offline learning algorithm becomes a significant challenge. To this end, we propose an algorithm referred to as Pessimistic ASsortment opTimizAtion (PASTA for short) designed based on the principle of pessimism, that can correctly identify the optimal assortment by only requiring the offline data to cover the optimal assortment under general settings. In particular, we establish a regret bound for the offline assortment optimization problem under the celebrated multinomial logit model. We also propose an efficient computational procedure to solve our pessimistic assortment optimization problem. Numerical studies demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method over the existing baseline method.