Daily Papers

Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a percentage of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether, our results suggest that injecting backdoors through data poisoning may be easier for large models than previously believed as the number of poisons required does not scale up with model size, highlighting the need for more research on defences to mitigate this risk in future models.

We release Gaperon, a fully open suite of French-English-coding language models designed to advance transparency and reproducibility in large-scale model training. The Gaperon family includes 1.5B, 8B, and 24B parameter models trained on 2-4 trillion tokens, released with all elements of the training pipeline: French and English datasets filtered with a neural quality classifier, an efficient data curation and training framework, and hundreds of intermediate checkpoints. Through this work, we study how data filtering and contamination interact to shape both benchmark and generative performance. We find that filtering for linguistic quality enhances text fluency and coherence but yields subpar benchmark results, and that late deliberate contamination -- continuing training on data mixes that include test sets -- recovers competitive scores while only reasonably harming generation quality. We discuss how usual neural filtering can unintentionally amplify benchmark leakage. To support further research, we also introduce harmless data poisoning during pretraining, providing a realistic testbed for safety studies. By openly releasing all models, datasets, code, and checkpoints, Gaperon establishes a reproducible foundation for exploring the trade-offs between data curation, evaluation, safety, and openness in multilingual language model development.

Multimodal contrastive pretraining has been used to train multimodal representation models, such as CLIP, on large amounts of paired image-text data. However, previous studies have revealed that such models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Specifically, when trained on backdoored examples, CLIP learns spurious correlations between the embedded backdoor trigger and the target label, aligning their representations in the joint embedding space. Injecting even a small number of poisoned examples, such as 75 examples in 3 million pretraining data, can significantly manipulate the model's behavior, making it difficult to detect or unlearn such correlations. To address this issue, we propose CleanCLIP, a finetuning framework that weakens the learned spurious associations introduced by backdoor attacks by independently re-aligning the representations for individual modalities. We demonstrate that unsupervised finetuning using a combination of multimodal contrastive and unimodal self-supervised objectives for individual modalities can significantly reduce the impact of the backdoor attack. Additionally, we show that supervised finetuning on task-specific labeled image data removes the backdoor trigger from the CLIP vision encoder. We show empirically that CleanCLIP maintains model performance on benign examples while erasing a range of backdoor attacks on multimodal contrastive learning. The code and checkpoints are available at https://github.com/nishadsinghi/CleanCLIP.

Contrastive language-image pretraining (CLIP) has been found to be vulnerable to poisoning backdoor attacks where the adversary can achieve an almost perfect attack success rate on CLIP models by poisoning only 0.01\% of the training dataset. This raises security concerns on the current practice of pretraining large-scale models on unscrutinized web data using CLIP. In this work, we analyze the representations of backdoor-poisoned samples learned by CLIP models and find that they exhibit unique characteristics in their local subspace, i.e., their local neighborhoods are far more sparse than that of clean samples. Based on this finding, we conduct a systematic study on detecting CLIP backdoor attacks and show that these attacks can be easily and efficiently detected by traditional density ratio-based local outlier detectors, whereas existing backdoor sample detection methods fail. Our experiments also reveal that an unintentional backdoor already exists in the original CC3M dataset and has been trained into a popular open-source model released by OpenCLIP. Based on our detector, one can clean up a million-scale web dataset (e.g., CC3M) efficiently within 15 minutes using 4 Nvidia A100 GPUs. The code is publicly available in our https://github.com/HanxunH/Detect-CLIP-Backdoor-Samples{GitHub repository}.

Recent work has demonstrated that controlled pretraining experiments are a powerful tool for understanding learning, reasoning, and memorization in large language models (LLMs). However, the computational cost of pretraining presents a significant constraint. To overcome this constraint, we propose to conduct multiple pretraining experiments simultaneously during a single training run. We demonstrate the feasibility of this approach by conducting ten experiments during the training of a 1.5B parameter model on 210B tokens. Although we only train a single model, we can replicate the results from multiple previous works on data contamination, poisoning, and memorization. We also conduct novel investigations into knowledge acquisition, mathematical reasoning, and watermarking. For example, we dynamically update the training data until the model acquires a particular piece of knowledge. Remarkably, the influence of the ten experiments on the model's training dynamics and overall performance is minimal. However, interactions between different experiments may act as a potential confounder in our approach. We propose to test for interactions with continual pretraining experiments, finding them to be negligible in our setup. Overall, our findings suggest that performing multiple pretraining experiments in a single training run can enable rigorous scientific experimentation with large models on a compute budget.

Large language models are pre-trained on uncurated text datasets consisting of trillions of tokens scraped from the Web. Prior work has shown that: (1) web-scraped pre-training datasets can be practically poisoned by malicious actors; and (2) adversaries can compromise language models after poisoning fine-tuning datasets. Our work evaluates for the first time whether language models can also be compromised during pre-training, with a focus on the persistence of pre-training attacks after models are fine-tuned as helpful and harmless chatbots (i.e., after SFT and DPO). We pre-train a series of LLMs from scratch to measure the impact of a potential poisoning adversary under four different attack objectives (denial-of-service, belief manipulation, jailbreaking, and prompt stealing), and across a wide range of model sizes (from 600M to 7B). Our main result is that poisoning only 0.1% of a model's pre-training dataset is sufficient for three out of four attacks to measurably persist through post-training. Moreover, simple attacks like denial-of-service persist through post-training with a poisoning rate of only 0.001%.

Large language models (LLMs) continually evolve through pre-training on ever-expanding web data, but this adaptive process also exposes them to subtle forms of misinformation. While prior work has explored data poisoning during static pre-training, the effects of such manipulations under continual pre-training remain largely unexplored. Drawing inspiration from the illusory truth effect in human cognition - where repeated exposure to falsehoods increases belief in their accuracy - we ask whether LLMs exhibit a similar vulnerability. We investigate whether repeated exposure to false but confidently stated facts can shift a model's internal representation away from the truth. We introduce Layer of Truth, a framework and dataset for probing belief dynamics in continually trained LLMs. By injecting controlled amounts of poisoned data and probing intermediate representations across checkpoints, model scales, and question types, we quantify when and how factual beliefs shift. Our findings reveal that even minimal exposure can induce persistent representational drift in well-established facts, with susceptibility varying across layers and model sizes. These results highlight an overlooked vulnerability of continually updated LLMs: their capacity to internalize misinformation analogously to humans, underscoring the need for robust monitoring of factual integrity during model updates.

Pretrained neural language models (LMs) are prone to generating racist, sexist, or otherwise toxic language which hinders their safe deployment. We investigate the extent to which pretrained LMs can be prompted to generate toxic language, and the effectiveness of controllable text generation algorithms at preventing such toxic degeneration. We create and release RealToxicityPrompts, a dataset of 100K naturally occurring, sentence-level prompts derived from a large corpus of English web text, paired with toxicity scores from a widely-used toxicity classifier. Using RealToxicityPrompts, we find that pretrained LMs can degenerate into toxic text even from seemingly innocuous prompts. We empirically assess several controllable generation methods, and find that while data- or compute-intensive methods (e.g., adaptive pretraining on non-toxic data) are more effective at steering away from toxicity than simpler solutions (e.g., banning "bad" words), no current method is failsafe against neural toxic degeneration. To pinpoint the potential cause of such persistent toxic degeneration, we analyze two web text corpora used to pretrain several LMs (including GPT-2; Radford et. al, 2019), and find a significant amount of offensive, factually unreliable, and otherwise toxic content. Our work provides a test bed for evaluating toxic generations by LMs and stresses the need for better data selection processes for pretraining.

In large language model (LLM) pretraining, data quality is believed to determine model quality. In this paper, we re-examine the notion of "quality" from the perspective of pre- and post-training co-design. Specifically, we explore the possibility that pre-training on more toxic data can lead to better control in post-training, ultimately decreasing a model's output toxicity. First, we use a toy experiment to study how data composition affects the geometry of features in the representation space. Next, through controlled experiments with Olmo-1B models trained on varying ratios of clean and toxic data, we find that the concept of toxicity enjoys a less entangled linear representation as the proportion of toxic data increases. Furthermore, we show that although toxic data increases the generational toxicity of the base model, it also makes the toxicity easier to remove. Evaluations on Toxigen and Real Toxicity Prompts demonstrate that models trained on toxic data achieve a better trade-off between reducing generational toxicity and preserving general capabilities when detoxifying techniques such as inference-time intervention (ITI) are applied. Our findings suggest that, with post-training taken into account, bad data may lead to good models.

Recent research has highlighted the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) against data poisoning attacks. These attacks aim to inject poisoning samples into the models' training dataset such that the trained models have inference failures. While previous studies have executed different types of attacks, one major challenge that greatly limits their effectiveness is the uncertainty of the re-training process after the injection of poisoning samples, including the re-training initialization or algorithms. To address this challenge, we propose a novel attack method called ''Sharpness-Aware Data Poisoning Attack (SAPA)''. In particular, it leverages the concept of DNNs' loss landscape sharpness to optimize the poisoning effect on the worst re-trained model. It helps enhance the preservation of the poisoning effect, regardless of the specific retraining procedure employed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SAPA offers a general and principled strategy that significantly enhances various types of poisoning attacks.

Pretraining datasets are foundational to the development of multimodal models, yet they often have inherent biases and toxic content from the web-scale corpora they are sourced from. In this paper, we investigate the prevalence of toxicity in LLaVA image-text pretraining dataset, examining how harmful content manifests in different modalities. We present a comprehensive analysis of common toxicity categories and propose targeted mitigation strategies, resulting in the creation of a refined toxicity-mitigated dataset. This dataset removes 7,531 of toxic image-text pairs in the LLaVA pre-training dataset. We offer guidelines for implementing robust toxicity detection pipelines. Our findings underscore the need to actively identify and filter toxic content - such as hate speech, explicit imagery, and targeted harassment - to build more responsible and equitable multimodal systems. The toxicity-mitigated dataset is open source and is available for further research.

Pre-trained language models (LMs) are shown to easily generate toxic language. In this work, we systematically explore domain-adaptive training to reduce the toxicity of language models. We conduct this study on three dimensions: training corpus, model size, and parameter efficiency. For the training corpus, we propose to leverage the generative power of LMs and generate nontoxic datasets for domain-adaptive training, which mitigates the exposure bias and is shown to be more data-efficient than using a curated pre-training corpus. We demonstrate that the self-generation method consistently outperforms the existing baselines across various model sizes on both automatic and human evaluations, even when it uses a 1/3 smaller training corpus. We then comprehensively study detoxifying LMs with parameter sizes ranging from 126M up to 530B (3x larger than GPT-3), a scale that has never been studied before. We find that i) large LMs have similar toxicity levels as smaller ones given the same pre-training corpus, and ii) large LMs require more endeavor to detoxify. We also explore parameter-efficient training methods for detoxification. We demonstrate that adding and training adapter-only layers in LMs not only saves a lot of parameters but also achieves a better trade-off between toxicity and perplexity than whole model adaptation for the large-scale models.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.

Pre-training (PT) followed by fine-tuning (FT) is an effective method for training neural networks, and has led to significant performance improvements in many domains. PT can incorporate various design choices such as task and data reweighting strategies, augmentation policies, and noise models, all of which can significantly impact the quality of representations learned. The hyperparameters introduced by these strategies therefore must be tuned appropriately. However, setting the values of these hyperparameters is challenging. Most existing methods either struggle to scale to high dimensions, are too slow and memory-intensive, or cannot be directly applied to the two-stage PT and FT learning process. In this work, we propose an efficient, gradient-based algorithm to meta-learn PT hyperparameters. We formalize the PT hyperparameter optimization problem and propose a novel method to obtain PT hyperparameter gradients by combining implicit differentiation and backpropagation through unrolled optimization. We demonstrate that our method improves predictive performance on two real-world domains. First, we optimize high-dimensional task weighting hyperparameters for multitask pre-training on protein-protein interaction graphs and improve AUROC by up to 3.9%. Second, we optimize a data augmentation neural network for self-supervised PT with SimCLR on electrocardiography data and improve AUROC by up to 1.9%.

Large pretrained models such as GPT-3 have had tremendous impact on modern natural language processing by leveraging self-supervised learning to learn salient representations that can be used to readily finetune on a wide variety of downstream tasks. We investigate the possibility of transferring such advances to molecular machine learning by building a chemical foundation model, ChemBERTa-2, using the language of SMILES. While labeled data for molecular prediction tasks is typically scarce, libraries of SMILES strings are readily available. In this work, we build upon ChemBERTa by optimizing the pretraining process. We compare multi-task and self-supervised pretraining by varying hyperparameters and pretraining dataset size, up to 77M compounds from PubChem. To our knowledge, the 77M set constitutes one of the largest datasets used for molecular pretraining to date. We find that with these pretraining improvements, we are competitive with existing state-of-the-art architectures on the MoleculeNet benchmark suite. We analyze the degree to which improvements in pretraining translate to improvement on downstream tasks.

Despite the advanced capabilities of contemporary machine learning (ML) models, they remain vulnerable to adversarial and backdoor attacks. This vulnerability is particularly concerning in real-world deployments, where compromised models may exhibit unpredictable behavior in critical scenarios. Such risks are heightened by the prevalent practice of collecting massive, internet-sourced datasets for training multimodal models, as these datasets may harbor backdoors. Various techniques have been proposed to mitigate the effects of backdooring in multimodal models, such as CleanCLIP, which is the current state-of-the-art approach. In this work, we demonstrate that the efficacy of CleanCLIP in mitigating backdoors is highly dependent on the particular objective used during model pre-training. We observe that stronger pre-training objectives that lead to higher zero-shot classification performance correlate with harder to remove backdoors behaviors. We show this by training multimodal models on two large datasets consisting of 3 million (CC3M) and 6 million (CC6M) datapoints, under various pre-training objectives, followed by poison removal using CleanCLIP. We find that CleanCLIP, even with extensive hyperparameter tuning, is ineffective in poison removal when stronger pre-training objectives are used. Our findings underscore critical considerations for ML practitioners who train models using large-scale web-curated data and are concerned about potential backdoor threats.

Recently, the newly emerged multimodal models, which leverage both visual and linguistic modalities to train powerful encoders, have gained increasing attention. However, learning from a large-scale unlabeled dataset also exposes the model to the risk of potential poisoning attacks, whereby the adversary aims to perturb the model's training data to trigger malicious behaviors in it. In contrast to previous work, only poisoning visual modality, in this work, we take the first step to studying poisoning attacks against multimodal models in both visual and linguistic modalities. Specially, we focus on answering two questions: (1) Is the linguistic modality also vulnerable to poisoning attacks? and (2) Which modality is most vulnerable? To answer the two questions, we propose three types of poisoning attacks against multimodal models. Extensive evaluations on different datasets and model architectures show that all three attacks can achieve significant attack performance while maintaining model utility in both visual and linguistic modalities. Furthermore, we observe that the poisoning effect differs between different modalities. To mitigate the attacks, we propose both pre-training and post-training defenses. We empirically show that both defenses can significantly reduce the attack performance while preserving the model's utility.

Data poisoning attacks pose a significant threat to the integrity of machine learning models by leading to misclassification of target distribution data by injecting adversarial examples during training. Existing state-of-the-art (SoTA) defense methods suffer from limitations, such as significantly reduced generalization performance and significant overhead during training, making them impractical or limited for real-world applications. In response to this challenge, we introduce a universal data purification method that defends naturally trained classifiers from malicious white-, gray-, and black-box image poisons by applying a universal stochastic preprocessing step Psi_{T}(x), realized by iterative Langevin sampling of a convergent Energy Based Model (EBM) initialized with an image x. Mid-run dynamics of Psi_{T}(x) purify poison information with minimal impact on features important to the generalization of a classifier network. We show that EBMs remain universal purifiers, even in the presence of poisoned EBM training data, and achieve SoTA defense on leading triggered and triggerless poisons. This work is a subset of a larger framework introduced in \pgen with a more detailed focus on EBM purification and poison defense.

Modern neural networks are often trained on massive datasets that are web scraped with minimal human inspection. As a result of this insecure curation pipeline, an adversary can poison or backdoor the resulting model by uploading malicious data to the internet and waiting for a victim to scrape and train on it. Existing approaches for creating poisons and backdoors start with randomly sampled clean data, called base samples, and then modify those samples to craft poisons. However, some base samples may be significantly more amenable to poisoning than others. As a result, we may be able to craft more potent poisons by carefully choosing the base samples. In this work, we use guided diffusion to synthesize base samples from scratch that lead to significantly more potent poisons and backdoors than previous state-of-the-art attacks. Our Guided Diffusion Poisoning (GDP) base samples can be combined with any downstream poisoning or backdoor attack to boost its effectiveness. Our implementation code is publicly available at: https://github.com/hsouri/GDP .

Web-scraped datasets are vulnerable to data poisoning, which can be used for backdooring deep image classifiers during training. Since training on large datasets is expensive, a model is trained once and re-used many times. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks often target specific classes rather than any class learned by the model. One might expect that targeting many classes through a naive composition of attacks vastly increases the number of poison samples. We show this is not necessarily true and more efficient, universal data poisoning attacks exist that allow controlling misclassifications from any source class into any target class with a small increase in poison samples. Our idea is to generate triggers with salient characteristics that the model can learn. The triggers we craft exploit a phenomenon we call inter-class poison transferability, where learning a trigger from one class makes the model more vulnerable to learning triggers for other classes. We demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our universal backdoor attacks by controlling models with up to 6,000 classes while poisoning only 0.15% of the training dataset. Our source code is available at https://github.com/Ben-Schneider-code/Universal-Backdoor-Attacks.

Pretraining is the preliminary and fundamental step in developing capable language models (LM). Despite this, pretraining data design is critically under-documented and often guided by empirically unsupported intuitions. To address this, we pretrain 28 1.5B parameter decoder-only models, training on data curated (1) at different times, (2) with varying toxicity and quality filters, and (3) with different domain compositions. First, we quantify the effect of pretraining data age. A temporal shift between evaluation data and pretraining data leads to performance degradation, which is not overcome by finetuning. Second, we explore the effect of quality and toxicity filters, showing a trade-off between performance on standard benchmarks and risk of toxic generations. Our findings indicate there does not exist a one-size-fits-all solution to filtering training data. We also find that the effects of different types of filtering are not predictable from text domain characteristics. Lastly, we empirically validate that the inclusion of heterogeneous data sources, like books and web, is broadly beneficial and warrants greater prioritization. These findings constitute the largest set of experiments to validate, quantify, and expose many undocumented intuitions about text pretraining, which we hope will help support more informed data-centric decisions in LM development.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated great potential as generalist assistants, showcasing powerful task understanding and problem-solving capabilities. To deploy LLMs as AI assistants, it is crucial that these models exhibit desirable behavioral traits, such as non-toxicity and resilience against jailbreak attempts. Current methods for detoxification or preventing jailbreaking usually involve Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) or Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), which requires finetuning billions of parameters through gradient descent with substantial computation cost. Furthermore, models modified through SFT and RLHF may deviate from the pretrained models, potentially leading to a degradation in foundational LLM capabilities. In this paper, we observe that surprisingly, directly editing a small subset of parameters can effectively modulate specific behaviors of LLMs, such as detoxification and resistance to jailbreaking. Specifically, for a behavior that we aim to avoid, we employ a linear classifier, which we term the behavior probe, to classify binary behavior labels within the hidden state space of the LLM. Using this probe, we introduce an algorithm to identify a critical subset of LLM parameters that significantly influence this targeted behavior. Then we directly edit these selected parameters by shifting them towards the behavior probe. Such a direct parameter editing method necessitates only inference-level computational resources. Experiments demonstrate that in the representative detoxification task, our approach achieves reductions of up to 90.0\% in toxicity on the RealToxicityPrompts dataset and 49.2\% on ToxiGen, while maintaining the LLM's general capabilities in areas such as common sense, question answering, and mathematics. Our code is available at https://github.com/lucywang720/model-surgery.

Modern Large Language Models (LLMs) are excellent at generating synthetic data. However, their performance in sensitive domains such as text detoxification has not received proper attention from the scientific community. This paper explores the possibility of using LLM-generated synthetic toxic data as an alternative to human-generated data for training models for detoxification. Using Llama 3 and Qwen activation-patched models, we generated synthetic toxic counterparts for neutral texts from ParaDetox and SST-2 datasets. Our experiments show that models fine-tuned on synthetic data consistently perform worse than those trained on human data, with a drop in performance of up to 30% in joint metrics. The root cause is identified as a critical lexical diversity gap: LLMs generate toxic content using a small, repetitive vocabulary of insults that fails to capture the nuances and variety of human toxicity. These findings highlight the limitations of current LLMs in this domain and emphasize the continued importance of diverse, human-annotated data for building robust detoxification systems.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, the risk of generating harmful or toxic content remains a central challenge. Post-hoc alignment methods are brittle: once unsafe patterns are learned during pretraining, they are hard to remove. We present a data-centric pretraining framework that builds safety into the model from the start. Our contributions include: (i) a safety classifier trained on 10,000 GPT-4 labeled examples, used to filter 600B tokens; (ii) the largest synthetic safety dataset to date (100B tokens) generated via recontextualization of harmful web data; (iii) RefuseWeb and Moral Education datasets that convert harmful prompts into refusal dialogues and web-style educational material; (iv) Harmfulness-Tag annotations injected during pretraining to flag unsafe content and steer away inference from harmful generations; and (v) safety evaluations measuring base model behavior before instruction tuning. Our safety-pretrained models reduce attack success rates from 38.8% to 8.4% with no performance degradation on standard LLM safety benchmarks.

Multimodal contrastive learning methods like CLIP train on noisy and uncurated training datasets. This is cheaper than labeling datasets manually, and even improves out-of-distribution robustness. We show that this practice makes backdoor and poisoning attacks a significant threat. By poisoning just 0.01% of a dataset (e.g., just 300 images of the 3 million-example Conceptual Captions dataset), we can cause the model to misclassify test images by overlaying a small patch. Targeted poisoning attacks, whereby the model misclassifies a particular test input with an adversarially-desired label, are even easier requiring control of 0.0001% of the dataset (e.g., just three out of the 3 million images). Our attacks call into question whether training on noisy and uncurated Internet scrapes is desirable.

Recently, NLP has seen a surge in the usage of large pre-trained models. Users download weights of models pre-trained on large datasets, then fine-tune the weights on a task of their choice. This raises the question of whether downloading untrusted pre-trained weights can pose a security threat. In this paper, we show that it is possible to construct ``weight poisoning'' attacks where pre-trained weights are injected with vulnerabilities that expose ``backdoors'' after fine-tuning, enabling the attacker to manipulate the model prediction simply by injecting an arbitrary keyword. We show that by applying a regularization method, which we call RIPPLe, and an initialization procedure, which we call Embedding Surgery, such attacks are possible even with limited knowledge of the dataset and fine-tuning procedure. Our experiments on sentiment classification, toxicity detection, and spam detection show that this attack is widely applicable and poses a serious threat. Finally, we outline practical defenses against such attacks. Code to reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/neulab/RIPPLe.

This paper investigates using knowledge editing techniques to detoxify Large Language Models (LLMs). We construct a benchmark, SafeEdit, which covers nine unsafe categories with various powerful attack prompts and equips comprehensive metrics for systematic evaluation. We conduct experiments to compare knowledge editing approaches with previous baselines, indicating that knowledge editing has the potential to efficiently detoxify LLMs with limited impact on general performance. Then, we propose a simple yet effective baseline, dubbed Detoxifying with Intraoperative Neural Monitoring (DINM), to diminish the toxicity of LLMs within a few tuning steps via only one instance. We further provide an in-depth analysis of the internal mechanism for various detoxify approaches, demonstrating that previous methods like SFT and DPO may merely suppress the activations of toxic parameters, while DINM mitigates the toxicity of the toxic parameters to a certain extent, making permanent adjustments. We hope that these insights could shed light on future work of developing detoxifying approaches and the underlying knowledge mechanisms of LLMs. Code and benchmark are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit.

Millions of individuals' well-being are challenged by the harms of substance use. Harm reduction as a public health strategy is designed to improve their health outcomes and reduce safety risks. Some large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated a decent level of medical knowledge, promising to address the information needs of people who use drugs (PWUD). However, their performance in relevant tasks remains largely unexplored. We introduce HRIPBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate LLM's accuracy and safety risks in harm reduction information provision. The benchmark dataset HRIP-Basic has 2,160 question-answer-evidence pairs. The scope covers three tasks: checking safety boundaries, providing quantitative values, and inferring polysubstance use risks. We build the Instruction and RAG schemes to evaluate model behaviours based on their inherent knowledge and the integration of domain knowledge. Our results indicate that state-of-the-art LLMs still struggle to provide accurate harm reduction information, and sometimes, carry out severe safety risks to PWUD. The use of LLMs in harm reduction contexts should be cautiously constrained to avoid inducing negative health outcomes. WARNING: This paper contains illicit content that potentially induces harms.

While state-of-the-art diffusion models (DMs) excel in image generation, concerns regarding their security persist. Earlier research highlighted DMs' vulnerability to data poisoning attacks, but these studies placed stricter requirements than conventional methods like `BadNets' in image classification. This is because the art necessitates modifications to the diffusion training and sampling procedures. Unlike the prior work, we investigate whether BadNets-like data poisoning methods can directly degrade the generation by DMs. In other words, if only the training dataset is contaminated (without manipulating the diffusion process), how will this affect the performance of learned DMs? In this setting, we uncover bilateral data poisoning effects that not only serve an adversarial purpose (compromising the functionality of DMs) but also offer a defensive advantage (which can be leveraged for defense in classification tasks against poisoning attacks). We show that a BadNets-like data poisoning attack remains effective in DMs for producing incorrect images (misaligned with the intended text conditions). Meanwhile, poisoned DMs exhibit an increased ratio of triggers, a phenomenon we refer to as `trigger amplification', among the generated images. This insight can be then used to enhance the detection of poisoned training data. In addition, even under a low poisoning ratio, studying the poisoning effects of DMs is also valuable for designing robust image classifiers against such attacks. Last but not least, we establish a meaningful linkage between data poisoning and the phenomenon of data replications by exploring DMs' inherent data memorization tendencies.

Pretrained neural networks have attracted significant interest in chemistry and small molecule drug design. Embeddings from these models are widely used for molecular property prediction, virtual screening, and small data learning in molecular chemistry. This study presents the most extensive comparison of such models to date, evaluating 25 models across 25 datasets. Under a fair comparison framework, we assess models spanning various modalities, architectures, and pretraining strategies. Using a dedicated hierarchical Bayesian statistical testing model, we arrive at a surprising result: nearly all neural models show negligible or no improvement over the baseline ECFP molecular fingerprint. Only the CLAMP model, which is also based on molecular fingerprints, performs statistically significantly better than the alternatives. These findings raise concerns about the evaluation rigor in existing studies. We discuss potential causes, propose solutions, and offer practical recommendations.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is a popular method for aligning Language Models (LM) with human values and preferences. RLHF requires a large number of preference pairs as training data, which are often used in both the Supervised Fine-Tuning and Reward Model training and therefore publicly available datasets are commonly used. In this work, we study to what extent a malicious actor can manipulate the LMs generations by poisoning the preferences, i.e., injecting poisonous preference pairs into these datasets and the RLHF training process. We propose strategies to build poisonous preference pairs and test their performance by poisoning two widely used preference datasets. Our results show that preference poisoning is highly effective: injecting a small amount of poisonous data (1-5\% of the original dataset), we can effectively manipulate the LM to generate a target entity in a target sentiment (positive or negative). The findings from our experiments also shed light on strategies to defend against the preference poisoning attack.

Language detoxification involves removing toxicity from offensive language. While a neutral-toxic paired dataset provides a straightforward approach for training detoxification models, creating such datasets presents several challenges: i) the need for human annotation to build paired data, and ii) the rapid evolution of offensive terms, rendering static datasets quickly outdated. To tackle these challenges, we introduce an automated paired data generation pipeline, called K/DA. This pipeline is designed to generate offensive language with implicit offensiveness and trend-aligned slang, making the resulting dataset suitable for detoxification model training. We demonstrate that the dataset generated by K/DA exhibits high pair consistency and greater implicit offensiveness compared to existing Korean datasets, and also demonstrates applicability to other languages. Furthermore, it enables effective training of a high-performing detoxification model with simple instruction fine-tuning.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have seen growing adoption across various scientific disciplines. These advancements encourage the investigation of molecule-text modeling within synthetic chemistry, a field dedicated to designing and conducting chemical reactions to synthesize new compounds with desired properties and applications. Current approaches, however, often neglect the critical role of multiple molecule graph interaction in understanding chemical reactions, leading to suboptimal performance in synthetic chemistry tasks. This study introduces PRESTO(Progressive Pretraining Enhances Synthetic Chemistry Outcomes), a new framework that bridges the molecule-text modality gap by integrating a comprehensive benchmark of pretraining strategies and dataset configurations. It progressively improves multimodal LLMs through cross-modal alignment and multi-graph understanding. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that PRESTO offers competitive results in downstream synthetic chemistry tasks. The code can be found at https://github.com/IDEA-XL/PRESTO.

An important issue with Large Language Models (LLMs) is their undesired ability to generate toxic language. In this work, we show that the neurons responsible for toxicity can be determined by their power to discriminate toxic sentences, and that toxic language can be mitigated by reducing their activation levels proportionally to this power. We propose AUROC adaptation (AurA), an intervention that can be applied to any pre-trained LLM to mitigate toxicity. As the intervention is proportional to the ability of each neuron to discriminate toxic content, it is free of any model-dependent hyperparameters. We show that AurA can achieve up to 2.2 times reduction in toxicity with only a 0.72 perplexity increase. We also show that AurA is effective with models of different scale (from 1.5B to 40B parameters), and its effectiveness in mitigating toxic language, while preserving common-sense zero-shot abilities, holds across all scales. AurA can be combined with pre-prompting strategies, boosting its average mitigation potential from 1.28times to 2.35times. Moreover, AurA can counteract adversarial pre-prompts that maliciously elicit toxic content, making it an effective method for deploying safer and less toxic models.

Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) was shown to be vulnerable to patch-based data poisoning backdoor attacks. It was shown that an adversary can poison a small part of the unlabeled data so that when a victim trains an SSL model on it, the final model will have a backdoor that the adversary can exploit. This work aims to defend self-supervised learning against such attacks. We use a three-step defense pipeline, where we first train a model on the poisoned data. In the second step, our proposed defense algorithm (PatchSearch) uses the trained model to search the training data for poisoned samples and removes them from the training set. In the third step, a final model is trained on the cleaned-up training set. Our results show that PatchSearch is an effective defense. As an example, it improves a model's accuracy on images containing the trigger from 38.2% to 63.7% which is very close to the clean model's accuracy, 64.6%. Moreover, we show that PatchSearch outperforms baselines and state-of-the-art defense approaches including those using additional clean, trusted data. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCDvision/PatchSearch

Foundation models have been transformational in machine learning fields such as natural language processing and computer vision. Similar success in atomic property prediction has been limited due to the challenges of training effective models across multiple chemical domains. To address this, we introduce Joint Multi-domain Pre-training (JMP), a supervised pre-training strategy that simultaneously trains on multiple datasets from different chemical domains, treating each dataset as a unique pre-training task within a multi-task framework. Our combined training dataset consists of sim120M systems from OC20, OC22, ANI-1x, and Transition-1x. We evaluate performance and generalization by fine-tuning over a diverse set of downstream tasks and datasets including: QM9, rMD17, MatBench, QMOF, SPICE, and MD22. JMP demonstrates an average improvement of 59% over training from scratch, and matches or sets state-of-the-art on 34 out of 40 tasks. Our work highlights the potential of pre-training strategies that utilize diverse data to advance property prediction across chemical domains, especially for low-data tasks.

This paper revisits the standard pretrain-then-finetune paradigm used in computer vision for visual recognition tasks. Typically, state-of-the-art foundation models are pretrained using large scale (weakly) supervised datasets with billions of images. We introduce an additional pre-pretraining stage that is simple and uses the self-supervised MAE technique to initialize the model. While MAE has only been shown to scale with the size of models, we find that it scales with the size of the training dataset as well. Thus, our MAE-based pre-pretraining scales with both model and data size making it applicable for training foundation models. Pre-pretraining consistently improves both the model convergence and the downstream transfer performance across a range of model scales (millions to billions of parameters), and dataset sizes (millions to billions of images). We measure the effectiveness of pre-pretraining on 10 different visual recognition tasks spanning image classification, video recognition, object detection, low-shot classification and zero-shot recognition. Our largest model achieves new state-of-the-art results on iNaturalist-18 (91.3%), 1-shot ImageNet-1k (62.1%), and zero-shot transfer on Food-101 (96.0%). Our study reveals that model initialization plays a significant role, even for web-scale pretraining with billions of images.

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

Prior works on detoxification are scattered in the sense that they do not cover all aspects of detoxification needed in a real-world scenario. Notably, prior works restrict the task of developing detoxification models to only a seen subset of platforms, leaving the question of how the models would perform on unseen platforms unexplored. Additionally, these works do not address non-detoxifiability, a phenomenon whereby the toxic text cannot be detoxified without altering the meaning. We propose GreenLLaMA, the first comprehensive end-to-end detoxification framework, which attempts to alleviate the aforementioned limitations. We first introduce a cross-platform pseudo-parallel corpus applying multi-step data processing and generation strategies leveraging ChatGPT. We then train a suite of detoxification models with our cross-platform corpus. We show that our detoxification models outperform the SoTA model trained with human-annotated parallel corpus. We further introduce explanation to promote transparency and trustworthiness. GreenLLaMA additionally offers a unique paraphrase detector especially dedicated for the detoxification task to tackle the non-detoxifiable cases. Through experimental analysis, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our cross-platform corpus and the robustness of GreenLLaMA against adversarial toxicity.

Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks qi2023fine-- a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs's safety alignment. Existing mitigation strategies include alignment stage solutions huang2024vaccine, rosati2024representation and fine-tuning stage solutions huang2024lazy,mukhoti2023fine. However, our evaluation shows that both categories of defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen -- a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense, which however, is necessary to guarantee finetune performance. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains \textit{agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage}. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks.Our project page is at https://huangtiansheng.github.io/Antidote_gh_page/

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable advancements in specialized fields such as finance, law, and medicine. However, in cybersecurity, we have noticed a lack of open-source datasets, with a particular lack of high-quality cybersecurity pretraining corpora, even though much research indicates that LLMs acquire their knowledge during pretraining. To address this, we present a comprehensive suite of datasets covering all major training stages, including pretraining, instruction fine-tuning, and reasoning distillation with cybersecurity-specific self-reflection data. Extensive ablation studies demonstrate their effectiveness on public cybersecurity benchmarks. In particular, continual pre-training on our dataset yields a 15.88% improvement in the aggregate score, while reasoning distillation leads to a 10% gain in security certification (CISSP). We will release all datasets and trained cybersecurity LLMs under the ODC-BY and MIT licenses to encourage further research in the community. For access to all datasets and model weights, please refer to https://huggingface.co/collections/trendmicro-ailab/primus-67b1fd27052b802b4af9d243.

Existing approaches to multilingual text detoxification are hampered by the scarcity of parallel multilingual datasets. In this work, we introduce a pipeline for the generation of multilingual parallel detoxification data. We also introduce SynthDetoxM, a manually collected and synthetically generated multilingual parallel text detoxification dataset comprising 16,000 high-quality detoxification sentence pairs across German, French, Spanish and Russian. The data was sourced from different toxicity evaluation datasets and then rewritten with nine modern open-source LLMs in few-shot setting. Our experiments demonstrate that models trained on the produced synthetic datasets have superior performance to those trained on the human-annotated MultiParaDetox dataset even in data limited setting. Models trained on SynthDetoxM outperform all evaluated LLMs in few-shot setting. We release our dataset and code to help further research in multilingual text detoxification.

Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF) is a methodology designed to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human preferences, playing an important role in LLMs alignment. Despite its advantages, RLHF relies on human annotators to rank the text, which can introduce potential security vulnerabilities if any adversarial annotator (i.e., attackers) manipulates the ranking score by up-ranking any malicious text to steer the LLM adversarially. To assess the red-teaming of RLHF against human preference data poisoning, we propose RankPoison, a poisoning attack method on candidates' selection of preference rank flipping to reach certain malicious behaviors (e.g., generating longer sequences, which can increase the computational cost). With poisoned dataset generated by RankPoison, we can perform poisoning attacks on LLMs to generate longer tokens without hurting the original safety alignment performance. Moreover, applying RankPoison, we also successfully implement a backdoor attack where LLMs can generate longer answers under questions with the trigger word. Our findings highlight critical security challenges in RLHF, underscoring the necessity for more robust alignment methods for LLMs.

Text detoxification aims to minimize the risk of language models producing toxic content. Existing detoxification methods of directly constraining the model output or further training the model on the non-toxic corpus fail to achieve a decent balance between detoxification effectiveness and generation quality. This issue stems from the neglect of constrain imposed by the context since language models are designed to generate output that closely matches the context while detoxification methods endeavor to ensure the safety of the output even if it semantically deviates from the context. In view of this, we introduce a Context-aware Model self-Detoxification~(CMD) framework that pays attention to both the context and the detoxification process, i.e., first detoxifying the context and then making the language model generate along the safe context. Specifically, CMD framework involves two phases: utilizing language models to synthesize data and applying these data for training. We also introduce a toxic contrastive loss that encourages the model generation away from the negative toxic samples. Experiments on various LLMs have verified the effectiveness of our MSD framework, which can yield the best performance compared to baselines.

The real-world impact of polarization and toxicity in the online sphere marked the end of 2020 and the beginning of this year in a negative way. Semeval-2021, Task 5 - Toxic Spans Detection is based on a novel annotation of a subset of the Jigsaw Unintended Bias dataset and is the first language toxicity detection task dedicated to identifying the toxicity-level spans. For this task, participants had to automatically detect character spans in short comments that render the message as toxic. Our model considers applying Virtual Adversarial Training in a semi-supervised setting during the fine-tuning process of several Transformer-based models (i.e., BERT and RoBERTa), in combination with Conditional Random Fields. Our approach leads to performance improvements and more robust models, enabling us to achieve an F1-score of 65.73% in the official submission and an F1-score of 66.13% after further tuning during post-evaluation.

While alignment algorithms are now commonly used to tune pre-trained language models towards a user's preferences, we lack explanations for the underlying mechanisms in which models become ``aligned'', thus making it difficult to explain phenomena like jailbreaks. In this work we study a popular algorithm, direct preference optimization (DPO), and the mechanisms by which it reduces toxicity. Namely, we first study how toxicity is represented and elicited in a pre-trained language model, GPT2-medium. We then apply DPO with a carefully crafted pairwise dataset to reduce toxicity. We examine how the resulting model averts toxic outputs, and find that capabilities learned from pre-training are not removed, but rather bypassed. We use this insight to demonstrate a simple method to un-align the model, reverting it back to its toxic behavior.

Large language models are increasingly trained on all the data ever produced by humans. Many have raised concerns about the trustworthiness of public benchmarks due to potential contamination in pre-training or fine-tuning datasets. While most data decontamination efforts apply string matching (e.g., n-gram overlap) to remove benchmark data, we show that these methods are insufficient, and simple variations of test data (e.g., paraphrasing, translation) can easily bypass these decontamination measures. Furthermore, we demonstrate that if such variation of test data is not eliminated, a 13B model can easily overfit a test benchmark and achieve drastically high performance, on par with GPT-4. We validate such observations in widely used benchmarks such as MMLU, GSK8k, and HumanEval. To address this growing risk, we propose a stronger LLM-based decontamination method and apply it to widely used pre-training and fine-tuning datasets, revealing significant previously unknown test overlap. For example, in pre-training sets such as RedPajama-Data-1T and StarCoder-Data, we identified that 8-18\% of the HumanEval benchmark overlaps. Interestingly, we also find such contamination in synthetic dataset generated by GPT-3.5/4, suggesting a potential risk of unintentional contamination. We urge the community to adopt stronger decontamination approaches when using public benchmarks. Moreover, we call for the community to actively develop fresh one-time exams to evaluate models accurately. Our decontamination tool is publicly available at https://github.com/lm-sys/llm-decontaminator.

Toxic conversations during software development interactions may have serious repercussions on a Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) development project. For example, victims of toxic conversations may become afraid to express themselves, therefore get demotivated, and may eventually leave the project. Automated filtering of toxic conversations may help a FOSS community to maintain healthy interactions among its members. However, off-the-shelf toxicity detectors perform poorly on Software Engineering (SE) datasets, such as one curated from code review comments. To encounter this challenge, we present ToxiCR, a supervised learning-based toxicity identification tool for code review interactions. ToxiCR includes a choice to select one of the ten supervised learning algorithms, an option to select text vectorization techniques, eight preprocessing steps, and a large-scale labeled dataset of 19,571 code review comments. Two out of those eight preprocessing steps are SE domain specific. With our rigorous evaluation of the models with various combinations of preprocessing steps and vectorization techniques, we have identified the best combination for our dataset that boosts 95.8% accuracy and 88.9% F1 score. ToxiCR significantly outperforms existing toxicity detectors on our dataset. We have released our dataset, pre-trained models, evaluation results, and source code publicly available at: https://github.com/WSU-SEAL/ToxiCR

We investigate the extent to which offline demonstration data can improve online learning. It is natural to expect some improvement, but the question is how, and by how much? We show that the degree of improvement must depend on the quality of the demonstration data. To generate portable insights, we focus on Thompson sampling (TS) applied to a multi-armed bandit as a prototypical online learning algorithm and model. The demonstration data is generated by an expert with a given competence level, a notion we introduce. We propose an informed TS algorithm that utilizes the demonstration data in a coherent way through Bayes' rule and derive a prior-dependent Bayesian regret bound. This offers insight into how pretraining can greatly improve online performance and how the degree of improvement increases with the expert's competence level. We also develop a practical, approximate informed TS algorithm through Bayesian bootstrapping and show substantial empirical regret reduction through experiments.

Even with various regulations in place across countries and social media platforms (Government of India, 2021; European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2022, digital abusive speech remains a significant issue. One potential approach to address this challenge is automatic text detoxification, a text style transfer (TST) approach that transforms toxic language into a more neutral or non-toxic form. To date, the availability of parallel corpora for the text detoxification task (Logachevavet al., 2022; Atwell et al., 2022; Dementievavet al., 2024a) has proven to be crucial for state-of-the-art approaches. With this work, we extend parallel text detoxification corpus to new languages -- German, Chinese, Arabic, Hindi, and Amharic -- testing in the extensive multilingual setup TST baselines. Next, we conduct the first of its kind an automated, explainable analysis of the descriptive features of both toxic and non-toxic sentences, diving deeply into the nuances, similarities, and differences of toxicity and detoxification across 9 languages. Finally, based on the obtained insights, we experiment with a novel text detoxification method inspired by the Chain-of-Thoughts reasoning approach, enhancing the prompting process through clustering on relevant descriptive attributes.

Bronchopulmonary dysplasia (BPD) is a chronic lung disease affecting 35% of extremely low birth weight infants. Defined by oxygen dependence at 36 weeks postmenstrual age, it causes lifelong respiratory complications. However, preventive interventions carry severe risks, including neurodevelopmental impairment, ventilator-induced lung injury, and systemic complications. Therefore, early BPD prognosis and prediction of BPD outcome is crucial to avoid unnecessary toxicity in low risk infants. Admission radiographs of extremely preterm infants are routinely acquired within 24h of life and could serve as a non-invasive prognostic tool. In this work, we developed and investigated a deep learning approach using chest X-rays from 163 extremely low-birth-weight infants (leq32 weeks gestation, 401-999g) obtained within 24 hours of birth. We fine-tuned a ResNet-50 pretrained specifically on adult chest radiographs, employing progressive layer freezing with discriminative learning rates to prevent overfitting and evaluated a CutMix augmentation and linear probing. For moderate/severe BPD outcome prediction, our best performing model with progressive freezing, linear probing and CutMix achieved an AUROC of 0.78 pm 0.10, balanced accuracy of 0.69 pm 0.10, and an F1-score of 0.67 pm 0.11. In-domain pre-training significantly outperformed ImageNet initialization (p = 0.031) which confirms domain-specific pretraining to be important for BPD outcome prediction. Routine IRDS grades showed limited prognostic value (AUROC 0.57 pm 0.11), confirming the need of learned markers. Our approach demonstrates that domain-specific pretraining enables accurate BPD prediction from routine day-1 radiographs. Through progressive freezing and linear probing, the method remains computationally feasible for site-level implementation and future federated learning deployments.

Few-shot classification with foundation models (e.g., CLIP, DINOv2, PaLM-2) enables users to build an accurate classifier with a few labeled training samples (called support samples) for a classification task. However, an attacker could perform data poisoning attacks by manipulating some support samples such that the classifier makes the attacker-desired, arbitrary prediction for a testing input. Empirical defenses cannot provide formal robustness guarantees, leading to a cat-and-mouse game between the attacker and defender. Existing certified defenses are designed for traditional supervised learning, resulting in sub-optimal performance when extended to few-shot classification. In our work, we propose FCert, the first certified defense against data poisoning attacks to few-shot classification. We show our FCert provably predicts the same label for a testing input under arbitrary data poisoning attacks when the total number of poisoned support samples is bounded. We perform extensive experiments on benchmark few-shot classification datasets with foundation models released by OpenAI, Meta, and Google in both vision and text domains. Our experimental results show our FCert: 1) maintains classification accuracy without attacks, 2) outperforms existing state-of-the-art certified defenses for data poisoning attacks, and 3) is efficient and general.

Large language models pretrained on extensive web corpora demonstrate remarkable performance across a wide range of downstream tasks. However, a growing concern is data contamination, where evaluation datasets may be contained in the pretraining corpus, inflating model performance. Decontamination, the process of detecting and removing such data, is a potential solution; yet these contaminants may originate from altered versions of the test set, evading detection during decontamination. How different types of contamination impact the performance of language models on downstream tasks is not fully understood. We present a taxonomy that categorizes the various types of contamination encountered by LLMs during the pretraining phase and identify which types pose the highest risk. We analyze the impact of contamination on two key NLP tasks -- summarization and question answering -- revealing how different types of contamination influence task performance during evaluation.

Perturbative availability poisons (PAPs) add small changes to images to prevent their use for model training. Current research adopts the belief that practical and effective approaches to countering PAPs do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is time to abandon this belief. We present extensive experiments showing that 12 state-of-the-art PAP methods are vulnerable to Image Shortcut Squeezing (ISS), which is based on simple compression. For example, on average, ISS restores the CIFAR-10 model accuracy to 81.73%, surpassing the previous best preprocessing-based countermeasures by 37.97% absolute. ISS also (slightly) outperforms adversarial training and has higher generalizability to unseen perturbation norms and also higher efficiency. Our investigation reveals that the property of PAP perturbations depends on the type of surrogate model used for poison generation, and it explains why a specific ISS compression yields the best performance for a specific type of PAP perturbation. We further test stronger, adaptive poisoning, and show it falls short of being an ideal defense against ISS. Overall, our results demonstrate the importance of considering various (simple) countermeasures to ensure the meaningfulness of analysis carried out during the development of PAP methods.

Caution: this paper may include material that could be offensive or distressing. The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) necessitates the development of training approaches that mitigate the generation of unethical language and aptly manage toxic user queries. Given the challenges related to human labor and the scarcity of data, we present KoTox, comprising 39K unethical instruction-output pairs. This collection of automatically generated toxic instructions refines the training of LLMs and establishes a foundational framework for improving LLMs' ethical awareness and response to various toxic inputs, promoting more secure and responsible interactions in Natural Language Processing (NLP) applications.

Pre-trained language models have achieved great success in various large-scale information retrieval tasks. However, most of pretraining tasks are based on counterfeit retrieval data where the query produced by the tailored rule is assumed as the user's issued query on the given document or passage. Therefore, we explore to use large-scale click logs to pretrain a language model instead of replying on the simulated queries. Specifically, we propose to use user behavior features to pretrain a debiased language model for document ranking. Extensive experiments on Baidu desensitization click logs validate the effectiveness of our method. Our team on WSDM Cup 2023 Pre-training for Web Search won the 1st place with a Discounted Cumulative Gain @ 10 (DCG@10) score of 12.16525 on the final leaderboard.

Text detoxification is a textual style transfer (TST) task where a text is paraphrased from a toxic surface form, e.g. featuring rude words, to the neutral register. Recently, text detoxification methods found their applications in various task such as detoxification of Large Language Models (LLMs) (Leong et al., 2023; He et al., 2024; Tang et al., 2023) and toxic speech combating in social networks (Deng et al., 2023; Mun et al., 2023; Agarwal et al., 2023). All these applications are extremely important to ensure safe communication in modern digital worlds. However, the previous approaches for parallel text detoxification corpora collection -- ParaDetox (Logacheva et al., 2022) and APPADIA (Atwell et al., 2022) -- were explored only in monolingual setup. In this work, we aim to extend ParaDetox pipeline to multiple languages presenting MultiParaDetox to automate parallel detoxification corpus collection for potentially any language. Then, we experiment with different text detoxification models -- from unsupervised baselines to LLMs and fine-tuned models on the presented parallel corpora -- showing the great benefit of parallel corpus presence to obtain state-of-the-art text detoxification models for any language.

In recent years, pretraining models have made significant advancements in the fields of natural language processing (NLP), computer vision (CV), and life sciences. The significant advancements in NLP and CV are predominantly driven by the expansion of model parameters and data size, a phenomenon now recognized as the scaling laws. However, research exploring scaling law in molecular pretraining models remains unexplored. In this work, we present Uni-Mol2 , an innovative molecular pretraining model that leverages a two-track transformer to effectively integrate features at the atomic level, graph level, and geometry structure level. Along with this, we systematically investigate the scaling law within molecular pretraining models, characterizing the power-law correlations between validation loss and model size, dataset size, and computational resources. Consequently, we successfully scale Uni-Mol2 to 1.1 billion parameters through pretraining on 800 million conformations, making it the largest molecular pretraining model to date. Extensive experiments show consistent improvement in the downstream tasks as the model size grows. The Uni-Mol2 with 1.1B parameters also outperforms existing methods, achieving an average 27% improvement on the QM9 and 14% on COMPAS-1D dataset.

Large Language Models have demonstrated impressive fluency across diverse tasks, yet their tendency to produce toxic content remains a critical challenge for AI safety and public trust. Existing toxicity mitigation approaches primarily manipulate individual neuron activations, but these methods suffer from instability, context dependence, and often compromise the model's core language abilities. To address these shortcomings, we investigate three key questions: the stability of neuron-level toxicity indicators, the advantages of structural (layer-wise) representations, and the interpretability of mechanisms driving toxic generation. Through extensive experiments on Jigsaw and ToxiCN datasets, we show that aggregated layer-wise features provide more robust signals than single neurons. Moreover, we observe conceptual limitations in prior works that conflate toxicity detection experts and generation experts within neuron-based interventions. To mitigate this, we propose a novel principled intervention technique, EigenShift, based on eigen-decomposition of the language model's final output layer. This method selectively targets generation-aligned components, enabling precise toxicity suppression without impairing linguistic competence. Our method requires no additional training or fine-tuning, incurs minimal computational cost, and is grounded in rigorous theoretical analysis.

Transformer-based deep neural networks have revolutionized the field of molecular-related prediction tasks by treating molecules as symbolic sequences. These models have been successfully applied in various organic chemical applications by pretraining them with extensive compound libraries and subsequently fine-tuning them with smaller in-house datasets for specific tasks. However, many conventional methods primarily focus on single molecules, with limited exploration of pretraining for reactions involving multiple molecules. In this paper, we propose ReactionT5, a novel model that leverages pretraining on the Open Reaction Database (ORD), a publicly available large-scale resource. We further fine-tune this model for yield prediction and product prediction tasks, demonstrating its impressive performance even with limited fine-tuning data compared to traditional models. The pre-trained ReactionT5 model is publicly accessible on the Hugging Face platform.

Semi-supervised machine learning (SSL) is gaining popularity as it reduces the cost of training ML models. It does so by using very small amounts of (expensive, well-inspected) labeled data and large amounts of (cheap, non-inspected) unlabeled data. SSL has shown comparable or even superior performances compared to conventional fully-supervised ML techniques. In this paper, we show that the key feature of SSL that it can learn from (non-inspected) unlabeled data exposes SSL to strong poisoning attacks. In fact, we argue that, due to its reliance on non-inspected unlabeled data, poisoning is a much more severe problem in SSL than in conventional fully-supervised ML. Specifically, we design a backdoor poisoning attack on SSL that can be conducted by a weak adversary with no knowledge of target SSL pipeline. This is unlike prior poisoning attacks in fully-supervised settings that assume strong adversaries with practically-unrealistic capabilities. We show that by poisoning only 0.2% of the unlabeled training data, our attack can cause misclassification of more than 80% of test inputs (when they contain the adversary's backdoor trigger). Our attacks remain effective across twenty combinations of benchmark datasets and SSL algorithms, and even circumvent the state-of-the-art defenses against backdoor attacks. Our work raises significant concerns about the practical utility of existing SSL algorithms.