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Dec 10

Generative Agents: Interactive Simulacra of Human Behavior

Believable proxies of human behavior can empower interactive applications ranging from immersive environments to rehearsal spaces for interpersonal communication to prototyping tools. In this paper, we introduce generative agents--computational software agents that simulate believable human behavior. Generative agents wake up, cook breakfast, and head to work; artists paint, while authors write; they form opinions, notice each other, and initiate conversations; they remember and reflect on days past as they plan the next day. To enable generative agents, we describe an architecture that extends a large language model to store a complete record of the agent's experiences using natural language, synthesize those memories over time into higher-level reflections, and retrieve them dynamically to plan behavior. We instantiate generative agents to populate an interactive sandbox environment inspired by The Sims, where end users can interact with a small town of twenty five agents using natural language. In an evaluation, these generative agents produce believable individual and emergent social behaviors: for example, starting with only a single user-specified notion that one agent wants to throw a Valentine's Day party, the agents autonomously spread invitations to the party over the next two days, make new acquaintances, ask each other out on dates to the party, and coordinate to show up for the party together at the right time. We demonstrate through ablation that the components of our agent architecture--observation, planning, and reflection--each contribute critically to the believability of agent behavior. By fusing large language models with computational, interactive agents, this work introduces architectural and interaction patterns for enabling believable simulations of human behavior.

  • 6 authors
·
Apr 6, 2023 3

Training Language Models for Social Deduction with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Communicating in natural language is a powerful tool in multi-agent settings, as it enables independent agents to share information in partially observable settings and allows zero-shot coordination with humans. However, most prior works are limited as they either rely on training with large amounts of human demonstrations or lack the ability to generate natural and useful communication strategies. In this work, we train language models to have productive discussions about their environment in natural language without any human demonstrations. We decompose the communication problem into listening and speaking. Our key idea is to leverage the agent's goal to predict useful information about the world as a dense reward signal that guides communication. Specifically, we improve a model's listening skills by training them to predict information about the environment based on discussions, and we simultaneously improve a model's speaking skills with multi-agent reinforcement learning by rewarding messages based on their influence on other agents. To investigate the role and necessity of communication in complex social settings, we study an embodied social deduction game based on Among Us, where the key question to answer is the identity of an adversarial imposter. We analyze emergent behaviors due to our technique, such as accusing suspects and providing evidence, and find that it enables strong discussions, doubling the win rates compared to standard RL. We release our code and models at https://socialdeductionllm.github.io/

  • 4 authors
·
Feb 9 3

Steering the Herd: A Framework for LLM-based Control of Social Learning

Algorithms increasingly serve as information mediators--from social media feeds and targeted advertising to the increasing ubiquity of LLMs. This engenders a joint process where agents combine private, algorithmically-mediated signals with learning from peers to arrive at decisions. To study such settings, we introduce a model of controlled sequential social learning in which an information-mediating planner (e.g. an LLM) controls the information structure of agents while they also learn from the decisions of earlier agents. The planner may seek to improve social welfare (altruistic planner) or to induce a specific action the planner prefers (biased planner). Our framework presents a new optimization problem for social learning that combines dynamic programming with decentralized action choices and Bayesian belief updates. We prove the convexity of the value function and characterize the optimal policies of altruistic and biased planners, which attain desired tradeoffs between the costs they incur and the payoffs they earn from induced agent choices. Notably, in some regimes the biased planner intentionally obfuscates the agents' signals. Even under stringent transparency constraints--information parity with individuals, no lying or cherry-picking, and full observability--we show that information mediation can substantially shift social welfare in either direction. We complement our theory with simulations in which LLMs act as both planner and agents. Notably, the LLM planner in our simulations exhibits emergent strategic behavior in steering public opinion that broadly mirrors the trends predicted, though key deviations suggest the influence of non-Bayesian reasoning consistent with the cognitive patterns of both humans and LLMs trained on human-like data. Together, we establish our framework as a tractable basis for studying the impact and regulation of LLM information mediators.

  • 4 authors
·
Apr 3